

PRESENTS:

**LAYER 2-ENCRYPTORS  
FOR  
METRO AND CARRIER ETHERNET  
WANs AND MANs**

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**MARKET OVERVIEW ETHERNET ENCRYPTORS FOR CARRIER  
ETHERNET, MPLS AND IP NETWORKS**

**(SHORT VERSION)**

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1. Encryption layer and security

Ethernet is playing a rapidly increasing role for connecting sites. Metro and Carrier Ethernet establish a standard for metropolitan and wide area networks that is situated on layer 2 of the OSI network model. This is one layer below IP, the Internet protocol, which is located on layer 3.

Encryption Layer	Usage Scenario and Protection
Layer 3: Network Layer (IP)	Remote Access, End-to-End Site-to-Site Network, End-to-End, multi-hop Multi-Site Network, End-to-End, multi-hop L3 VPN
Layer 2: Data Link Layer (Ethernet)	Hop-to-Hop Network, End-to-End (direct Link) Site-to-Site Network, End-to-End, multi-hop Multi-Site Network, End-to-End, multi-hop L2 VPN
Layer 1: Physical Layer	Hop-to-Hop (direct link)

Network encryption provides most efficiency and security if it takes place at the native layer or below. Encryption below the native layer can limit the flexibility available at the native layer.

The substantial increase in demand for layer 2 encryptors has a simple reason: Efficiency paired with cost savings. Over 99.9 percent of all network attacks target layer 3 to 7. Encrypting connections between sites at layer 2 prevents successful attacks, if the encryption is properly implemented. If authenticated encryption is used, then the benefits of encryption are not limited to data confidentiality, as the mechanism also provides intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, and firewalling at layer 2. The combination of security and efficiency is the reason for the rapidly increasing adoption of dedicated layer 2 encryption appliances. Some customers of such solutions are already operating up to 500 devices 24/7/365.

## 2. Different approaches


For network encryption there are different approaches and practices. They have a direct impact on the application scenarios supported and the security level provided by a solution.


There are different possibilities to encrypt Ethernet networks. It can be done at layer 1, layer 2 and layer 3. It is most efficient at layer 1 and layer 2, and most flexible at layer 2 and layer 3. The optimal combination of efficiency and flexibility is provided by Ethernet encryption at layer 2. Even at layer 2 there are different basic approaches.

### 2.1 Hop-by-Hop vs. End-to-End

For securing the connection between sites, an end-to-end encryption is the preferred approach, as a hop-by-hop encryption only works in a limited number of scenarios.

A hop-by-hop encryption is an encryption between two nodes that are one hop apart. At each hop the data is decrypted, processed in unencrypted form, re-encrypted and sent to the next hop. End-to-end encryption works differently: The data remains encrypted and secure during the entire transmission between sender and receiver.





In a local area network (LAN) a hop-by-hop encryption can be preferable, but in a MAN or WAN environment it should only be considered as an option if the next hop is also the endpoint of the connection. The usage scenario and the flexibility of hop-by-hop encryption solutions are severely limited. Therefore, this market overview focuses on solutions that provide end-to-end security.

## 2.2. Dedicated vs. integrated

It is simpler to optimize and secure a dedicated appliance for a specific scope of functions. Integrated solutions tend to come at a lower price and offer less functionality and less security. For Ethernet encryption, nearly all integrated solutions are based on LAN-oriented MACSec, whereas dedicated appliances offer security and functionality that is optimized for the use in MAN and WAN environments. The requirements for MAN and WAN encryption differ quite substantially from the requirements for a LAN encryption, be that in terms of network support or be that in terms of security. Dedicated solutions developed specifically for the protection of Carrier Ethernet networks tend to be better suited than integrated MACSec-based solutions as they have been engineered for the increased network and security requirements of MANs and WANs. While the first MACSec-based dedicated appliances based on the NSA Ethernet Security Specifications (ESS) and IEEE 802.1AEcg specifications are becoming available on the market, they deviate from the IEEE 802.1AE standard in order to support more Carrier Ethernet environments. These devices use FPGAs instead of ASICs, but inherit most of the shortcomings of MACSec, including the key management. In terms of network support, security and scalability they are still way behind most dedicated devices that have been developed specifically for the protection of Carrier Ethernet networks. ESS is work in progress and IEEE 802.1AEcg is still not finalized despite being years in the making. The standards for Carrier Ethernet security are set by the dedicated encryption appliances that have been available for over a decade. The devices that profited from ongoing development efforts have reached a high level of maturity and are widely deployed, setting the de-facto standards.

There is no standard for the end-to-end encryption for Metro and Carrier Ethernet and MPLS networks, but there are well-established and proven methods for the encryption of data networks that can be applied to Metro and Carrier Ethernet and MPLS networks while taking into account the specific requirements for the respective network type. The different vendors are using different approaches, both on the control and the data plane. The different market offers thus create a confusing and unclear situation. This market overview tries to make the different approaches comparable. It can however not make the quality of the implementation of the different offers comparable or assessable.



### 3. Criteria and coverage

#### 3.1. Criteria

The market overview is structured based on the key criteria that are relevant for making a preselection of products to evaluate:

- Interface/processing capabilities
- Supported networks and usage scenarios
- Platform used (hardware, firmware, key management)
- Encryption standards and processing options
- Encryption and security functionality on the data plane
- Encryption and security functionality on the control plane
- Key management and key system
- Network functionality and additional functionality
- Device management
- Certifications
- Device properties

There are explanations for the different criteria and implementation approaches. Where appropriate, links to neutral external information sources are provided,

Different customers often have different requirements. On the network side, they are defined by the characteristics and the usage scenario of the MAN and WAN used. On the security side, they are defined by the required protection level. There are different solution approaches to meet the security and network requirements.

There is no official standard for securing Carrier-Ethernet networks end-to-end. The different vendors use different approaches for securing the data and the control plane, making it hard to get a clear understanding of what is available on the market. This market overview tries to make the different offers comparable. Integrated solutions based on MACSec are not part of this market overview as MACSec is not an end-to-end but a hop-by-hop encryption. The vast majority of MACSec-based solutions is integrated into switches and routers and is using proprietary modifications to overcome at least some of the limitations of the IEEE standard for LANs. These modifications make the different MACSec implementations non-interoperable.

This market overview shows different approaches to securing Metro and Carrier Ethernet MANs and WANs. Each approach comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. The usage scenario of the user determines the functionality requirements. The most important evaluation criteria are product functionality, security level and cost. The product selection has an impact on security, compatibility, efficiency, flexibility and ongoing cost.

The objective is to show the current and planned market offer in terms of functionality from a vendor point of view. Products and approaches are not rated.

### 3.2. Coverage

For this market overview, all of the important and relevant vendors have provided detailed information. Five factors define the market relevance: The market acceptance, the installed base, the current sales volume, the state of the security and network support and the breadth of the offer. Not included are therefore vendors whose products miss essential security functions such as authenticated encryption, don't provide native Ethernet encryption, offer limited Carrier Ethernet support or don't have the product breadth to cover the relevant bandwidth scenarios from 100Mb to 10Gb. Also not included are Carrier devices, such as Ethernet Access Devices, that can only encrypt the network data once the unencrypted network data has been handed over to the Carrier. For trustworthy network security encryption must take place before the network data is handed over to the Carrier.

In terms of MACSec, the coverage is limited to devices following the IEEE 802.1AEcg draft as this draft is for client-side appliances. IEEE 802.1AEcg deviates from IEEE 802.1AE in many areas, defines five device categories, and remains stuck with MKA (MACSec Key Agreement). From an engineering and product point of view it would have probably been a better decision to define a new standard for Carrier Ethernet encryption including a well-suited key management than to try to make a LAN-standard work with the completely different requirements of securing Carrier Ethernet networks. Contrary to an integrated MACSec solution, IEEE 802.1AEcg-based appliances are dedicated and mostly use FPGAs separated from the network port for encryption. The attack surface of such an appliance is much lower than the attack surface of an integrated solution using an ASIC on the network interface.

### 3. Objective

The objective of this market overview is to show the current and the planned products of the different vendors in a structured and detailed way. It shows the different approaches and possibilities to secure Carrier Ethernet MANs and WANs. The security and functionality requirements are determined by the usage scenario. Product functionality and the overall security provided are the most important evaluation criteria, followed by the acquisition and operating cost. The product selection has an impact on security, compatibility, efficiency, flexibility and consequential costs.

This market overview makes no recommendations in terms of vendor and platform. It provides however all information necessary to create a shortlist for an RFI or an RFP.

This market overview is one documents out of a series of three, which also includes an introduction into the encryption for Metro and Carrier Ethernet networks and an evaluation guide. Each document has a different focus and different content. Together, these three documents provide essential information and help for evaluating different solutions. The download is free and no registration is required.

[http://www.uebermeister.com/files/inside-it/2016\\_Introduction\\_Encryption\\_Metro\\_and\\_Carrier\\_Ethernet.pdf](http://www.uebermeister.com/files/inside-it/2016_Introduction_Encryption_Metro_and_Carrier_Ethernet.pdf)

[http://www.uebermeister.com/files/inside-it/2014\\_Evaluation\\_Guide\\_Encryptors\\_Carrier\\_and\\_Metro\\_Ethernet.pdf](http://www.uebermeister.com/files/inside-it/2014_Evaluation_Guide_Encryptors_Carrier_and_Metro_Ethernet.pdf)

The MANs and WANs used can differ as substantially as the security requirements. There are different approaches to serve the different needs and demands.

## Chapter 2: Market Overview

### 1. Vendors and products

This market overview covers all relevant vendors of dedicated layer 2 encryption appliances for commercial customers that support a bandwidth spectrum of 100Mb to 10Gb whose products are available in Europe. The products have to meet current security standards, which excludes products lacking authentication and "Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)". Most of the devices have a certification issued by a certification body and have been approved for securing networks transporting classified government and defense data. All of these products are COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) products for government, defense and commercial use.

The reason for the limitation to autonomous devices are higher security, less complexity, and vendor-independence concerning switches and routers. Currently there is not even a secure and versatile integrated solution on the market that would offer Ethernet multipoint encryption for multi-hop networks.

Below, the alphabetical list of the vendors covered:

#### **Atmedia**

(<http://www.atmedia.de/en/index.html>)

#### **Gemalto**

(<https://safenet.gemalto.com/data-encryption/network-encryption>)

#### **IDQuantique**

(<http://www.idquantique.com>)

#### **Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity**

(<https://cybersecurity.rohde-schwarz.com/en/products/secure-networks/ethernet-encryption-rsr-sitline-eth>)

#### **Secunet**

(<http://www.secunet.com/en/topics-solutions/high-security/sina/sina-l2-box/>)

#### **Securosys**

(<https://www.securosys.ch/layer-2-encryptor-centurion>)

#### **Senetas**

(<http://www.senetas.com>)


## Thales

(<https://www.thales-esecurity.com/products-and-services/products-and-services/network-encryption-appliances/datacryptor-5000-series>)


## ViaSat

(<https://www.viasat.com/products/data-in-transit-encryption-for-enterprises>)

The offers available on the market are based on established platforms:



The following diagram shows the platforms the different vendor's products are based on.



The common denominator of the products is limited to the fact that they can encrypt Carrier Ethernet natively and authenticated. Except for the use of AES-GCM each platform does it differently and with different levels of network support. As the devices are network encryptors, the network support is as important as the encryption itself. On top, security technology and networks are subject to changing requirements and new carrier offers. Encryptors must be able to adapt to this evolution. Not all of them can. A limited flexibility of the encryptor normally leads to higher cost. Appliances based on FPGAs or CPUs can be undated and upgraded to adapt to new security and network requirements. The higher the flexibility of an encryption appliance, the higher the number of supported usage scenarios.

## 2. Network Standards and Platforms

### 2.1. Ethernet Interface and Data Throughput

The Ethernet network standard supported by a product determines the theoretical throughput of the encryptor. The relevant standards for Ethernet today are the IEEE 802.3 standards 10Mbit Ethernet, 100Mb/s Ethernet, 1Gb/s Ethernet, 10Gb/s, 25Gb/s, 40Gb/s 50 Gb/s Ethernet and 100Gb/s Ethernet. Next to those there is IEEE 2.5Gb/s and 5Gb/s Ethernet. IEEE is continuing to work on standardizing higher bandwidths, such as 200Gb/s and higher.

There are different options for network interfaces. Most of them are optical (SFP, SFP+, XFP, QSFP, QSFP+), with only RJ-45 being electrical.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Registered\\_jack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Registered_jack)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small\\_form-factor\\_pluggable\\_transceiver](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_form-factor_pluggable_transceiver)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XFP\\_transceiver](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XFP_transceiver)

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QSFP>

The bandwidth supported by an encryptor depends on the network interface and the software license. There is also the possibility of decoupling the encryptor bandwidth support from the bandwidths defined by the IEEE, as Metro and Carrier Ethernet support any bandwidth between 1 Mbit/sec and 100Gbit/sec. The processing power of the encryptor is defined by its overall implementation, not by the throughput of the network interface alone. The network interface just determines the maximum throughput. In a Metro and Carrier Ethernet environment it can be beneficial to not have bandwidth support restricted to the IEEE standards. The support of incremental steps allows a customer to have a solution that scales with his needs and where he doesn't have to pay today for expected future needs. It is however obvious that e.g. a 10Gb/s encryptor limited by software down to 100Mb/s will cost more than a pure 100Mb/s encryptor. Encryptors that run close to 100% capacity will always attain the best price/performance ratio.

Some of the encryptors – mostly 40Gb/s and 100Gb/s devices – have multiple ports that – depending on vendor implementation – can be encrypted individually or combined.

The effective data throughput is not only determined by the network interface and the supported bandwidth, but also the frame overhead, the frame forwarding efficiency, and the processing power of the encryptor. Parameters such as encryption standard, encryption hardware, encryption mode and operating mode can have a noticeable impact on the actual throughput.

A limited number of vendors also offer their layer 2 encryptors as virtual appliances. Their


security and performance depends on the operating environment. The characteristics of the hardware available to the virtual appliance are essential. Without dedicated and optimized hardware not all crucial functions have direct hardware support anymore, despite still being available. This leads to a loss of security and performance. There are only a few cases, in which the use of a virtual appliance makes sense. Even then, there must be sufficient computing resources for the encryption. For random number generation/key generation and key storage there should be appropriate hardware available, such as a network-based HSM. Theoretically it is even possible to secure a 100Gb/s connection with a virtual appliance, but only if the required computing resources are available. Such a setup will not meet the security level and the cost efficiency of a dedicated appliance, though.

## 2.2. Supported Network Topologies

Key system and available encryption modes are defining factors for the support of different network topologies and Metro and Carrier Ethernet standards.


### 2.2.1. Point-to-Point

A point-to-point connection connects two sites.




### 2.2.2. Point-to-Multipoint

Point-to-Multipoint topologies are multiple point-to-point connections or single point-to-multipoint connections that originate at the same central source.



### 2.2.3. Multipoint-to-Multipoint


Contrary to a point-to-multipoint topology, a multipoint-to-multipoint topology supports the direct connection between all sites. There is no single central site. Each site in a multipoint-to-multipoint can communicate directly with all other sites in the network.



## 2.3. Supported Metro and Carrier Ethernet Topologies

Encryption mode and key management are decisive factors for the proper support of the different MEF topologies.





## 2.4. Networks Supported for Encryption

Carrier Ethernet can be viewed as layer 2 VPN, as network service for MPLS and IP networks and as access ramp to the public internet. Even as the combination of all of them. Most of the products focus on Ethernet and layer 2 VPNs as each of the networks used for multi-site connectivity - Ethernet, MPLS and IP – has its own characteristics and requirements. Full support and security for MPLS- and IP-networks can only be accomplished with layer 3 encryption. There are only few offers on the market that support and protect all networks natively from layer 2 up to layer 3.

MPLS networks mostly require delivery at layer 3 (IP). It is located at layer 2.5 of the OSI-stack and can be either secured at layer 2 (if MPLSoE is used) or at layer 3 (if MPLSoIP is used). MPLS networks switch packets based on MPLS tags. At every MPLS switch the Ethernet sender address of the incoming frame is replaced with the Ethernet address of the MPLS switch. A key system that is dependent on the sender address of the Ethernet frame thus will face unwanted issues. Encrypting IP at layer 3 requires that the encryptor provides complete support for layer 3 infrastructures for IPv4 and IPv6.

It is not common practice yet to secure mixed environments with a single encryptor yet. Often a different encryptor is used for layer 2 and layer 3.


Processing Layer	Processing Mechanism
Layer 3: IP (Internet Protocol)	routed based on IP address
Layer 2.5: MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching)	switched based on MPLS tag
Layer 2: Ethernet	switched based on MAC address

## 2.5. Networks Supported for the Transport of Encrypted Frames

There are scenarios for the transport of encrypted frames, in which transport networks other than Carrier Ethernet must be supported. In such cases an Ethernet encryptor limited to Ethernet does not fit the bill. On the other hand, there are encryptors marketed as Ethernet encryptors that are limited to encrypting Ethernet and transporting it over IP (EoIP). Such products make only sense in cases where no native Ethernet is available for the transport of Ethernet, as native encryption is much more efficient. Many native Ethernet encryptors offer EoIP as additional functionality without being limited to it.

It can also happen that MPLS is used as transport network for Carrier Ethernet. The encrypted frame is then transported over MPLS (EoMPLS). As the encrypted Ethernet frame becomes MPLS payload, a native Ethernet payload encryption will keep the frame transparent to MPLS.

It becomes much more complex, if the objective is to encrypt a MPLS network, where some of the sites are connected at layer 2 and some of the sites are connected at layer 3.




The demands in terms of encryptor functionality are substantially increased, as next to the frame transport over IP also key exchange over IP has to be supported.

Processing Layer	Processing Mechanism
Layer 3: IP (Internet Protocol)	routed based on IP address
Layer 2.5: MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching)	switched based on MPLS tag
Layer 2: Ethernet	switched based on MAC address

## 2.6. Operating Scenario

Encryptors can be either self-managed or managed for a customer or tenant. For the latter the management software of the encryptor must support tenancy in order to enable Managed Encryption Services or Managed Security Services. A further scenario is the connection of multiple different customers. This requires multi-tenancy support by the management software and the key system.



If key ownership is to be with the tenant, additional requirements apply. When using certificate-based authentication and a different certificate authority per tenant there are particular challenges that need to be solved as it would be problematic to allow different CAs constant access to certificates located in an encryptor. The encryptors need the certificates for authentication and the certificates come from different root CAs, so that trust between the different CAs is a requirement.

Using pre-shared secrets is much simpler and efficient in such an environment.

## 2.7. Platform Used

The number of vendors surpasses the number of platform developers. Only three of the vendors develop their own platform: Atmedia, Rohde & Schwarz and Senetas. All others use one of these three established platforms or the IEEE 801.2AEcg draft.

IEEE 802.1AEcg is a MACSec-based platform that incorporated some input from the NSA Ethernet Security Specifications (ESS), but has neither found many supporting vendors nor many customers. The other three platforms have been designed and optimized from start to meet the special requirements set by Carrier Ethernet networks. Offers based on these platforms account for the vast majority of dedicated layer 2 encryption appliances sold and deployed worldwide with a market penetration of more than 90%. Not every product based on the same platform is necessarily identical. Some vendors do not limit the product differentiation to the front plate but others integrate additional code to differentiate the product and to meet certain certification requirements. In terms of certifications and approvals it has to be taken into consideration that a certification or an approval is not issued to a platform, only to products. Even if a platform developer receives certifications and approvals for his products, these are limited to his products. The products of vendors using that platform but selling it under their own name cannot profit from those certifications and approvals, even if the product is identical to the product of the platform developer.

The vendors that do not develop their own platform can be divided into two groups: The vendors that sell an existing product under their own name and the vendors that use a platform as base for their own product.

## 2.8 Operating Modes

Layer 2 encryptors should support different operating modes: Point-to-point (line mode) and multipoint (point-to-multipoint and mesh). These operating modes should be supported in all usage scenarios in a complete and autonomous way. As point-to-point is a subset of multipoint, each encryptor in multipoint mode can support point-to-point. This kind of point-to-point differs from what one would expect from a point-to-point encryptor that is optimized for point-to-point links.

For multipoint mode, the hardware requirements are drastically higher than for point-to-point as the complexity of the software (key management, key assignment, frame analysis, etc.) grows exponentially. Using such parameters such as VLAN-ID, MPLS tag, MAC address and QoS the encryptor has to process each single frame to and from each destination individually. The more destinations and options the higher the complexity and to keep everything secure. One of the bigger issues in that context is the key system as point-to-point encryption uses a pairwise key system, while multipoint encryption profits from group key systems.

### 3. Data Plane Encryption

#### 3.1. Encryption Standard

All of the encryptors in this market overview that are supporting bandwidths up to multiple Gb/s use AES with a key length of 256 bit. Up to seven years ago the most widely used block modes were Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) and the closely related Cipher-Feedback (CFB). In the meantime, the industry has moved to authenticated encryption and de facto standard AES-GCM. GCM stands for Galois Counter Mode and combines authentication with integrity and replay protection. AES provides the confidentiality, whereas GCM provides intrusion detection, intrusion prevention and a layer 2 firewall.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced\\_Encryption\\_Standard](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block\\_cipher\\_modes\\_of\\_operation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_modes_of_operation)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GCM\\_mode](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GCM_mode)

AES-CBC, which was predominant before the widespread use of AES-GCM, creates additional overhead by padding, unless used in combination with ciphertext stealing (CTS). As the implementation of CTS is rather complex, most developers do not make the extra effort.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipher\\_block\\_chaining](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipher_block_chaining)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext\\_stealing](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_stealing)

The encryption block mode has a direct influence on the frame format, the frame overhead and the security. Current best security practice is the use AES-GCM, which is also what MACSec, the IEEE standard for hop-by-hop encryption for campus-internal Ethernet networks uses. AES-GCM adds a frame overhead of 24-32 bytes, which is low compared to encryption at layer 3 (IPSec) and in relation to the added security.

Authentication, and replay and integrity protection play an increasingly important role in hop-by-hop and multi-hop networks, leading to a fast adoption of standards such as Galois Counter Mode (GCM). Today, enterprise-grade, government-grade and defense-grade encryption should use authenticated encryption with integrity and replay protection such as AES-GCM.

#### 3.2. Encryption Hardware

There are different approaches to build an encryptor. The approach selected has a direct influence on the cost and performance. The vendors, whose products are capable of encrypting high-speed connections at full bandwidth independent of frame size all have a long experience and a hardware design that uses a high-performance FPGA. The increased

development and production cost are compensated by the higher flexibility and performance. Not every FPGA is equal though, as performance and gate count differ between the diverse models and the encryption itself is just one of the jobs that is handled by the FPGA. A lower-cost, but much less flexible approach is the use of specialized security processors that come in the form of ASICs and take over the encryption function. Even lower cost is the use of software on a CPU, but that come at a price: Performance is dependent on the processing power of the CPU, the latency is increased and the security provided is lower.

### 3.3. Processing Method

Two different approaches exist for the processing of the frames, with each having its advantages and disadvantages.

An encryptor using the cut-through method starts with the encryption before the entire frame is read. This shortens the latency but results in the potential propagation of invalid frames, as invalid frames are not thrown away, but encrypted and sent to the target encryptor, which decrypts the first part of an invalid frame and passes it on to the next device, which then hopefully throws it away. Issues might also arise in case of missing data integrity when decrypting. If parts of the frame are transmitted before the integrity check took place, there is no way to pull them back. The next switch will have to throw those parts out.

The store-and-forward method reads the entire frame before starting the encryption or decryption process. This increases latency and makes the latency dependent on the frame size. Invalid frames can be detected and thrown away before the encryption process starts. Next to increasing the network hygiene the store-and-forward method also increases security.

### 3.4. Latency

The latency caused by the encryptor measures in microseconds per device. Decisive is the effective value per device and not just the latency caused by the actual encryption process. Product architecture and components used play an important role, with a latency of less than 10 microseconds offered by nearly every vendor of devices in the gigabit class. Factors responsible for varying latency on the same device are processing method, encryption mode and operating mode. Most of the vendors can supply the latency values for the different processing methods, encryption modes and operating modes in addition to the effective throughput values at given frame sizes and IMIX.

Latency should always be looked at in context with the overall latency of the connections as longer distance automatically leads to higher latency.

### 3.5. Encryption Offsets

The encryption offset is a feature that is highly relevant for network compatibility. It determines the starting point for the encryption and permits a full parameterization for the network that needs to be protected. Depending on the structure of the incoming frame and the desired limitation the encryption starts at a different location relative to the beginning of the frame. For a hop-by-hop encryption in a LAN it is sufficient to leave the MAC addresses unencrypted. In a MAN or WAN the situation is different. The VLAN tag should be left unencrypted and if a MPLS tag is present, then that tag should be left unencrypted as well. In such an environment, the encryption should only start with the payload, independent of position of the payload within the frame. Feature-limited encryptors require the manual entry of a single, fixed encryption offset. Variable encryption offsets are much more flexible and can be a requirement in multipoint networks, especially if the incoming frames differ in terms of number of VLAN tags and MPLS tags. In those cases, it is preferable to have the encryptor being able to figure out where to start the encryption based on the frame content.

### 3.6. The Encryption Modes

The encryption modes supported by the encryptor determine which parts of the frame are encrypted. They are an important part of the key functionality of an encryptor.

- If the entire frame is encrypted, everything is efficient and secure, but limited to dedicated direct lines. No chance to profit from the lower cost offered by managed services,
- If the encryption covers only the payload, all protocols above layer 2 are completely secured, but the protection for layer 2 protocols is limited to the payload.
- If the entire layer 2 should be encrypted and the connection is over a shared infrastructure, the only choice is to tunnel the frames. This causes an overhead equal in size to the Ethernet header. This overhead can lead to frame sizes larger than supported by the network. Upstream traffic shapers in IPv4 networks can ensure that the frame size does not surpass the supported MTU. In IPv6 network packet size negotiation is handled between the communicating devices, which tend to be routers.

The encryption mode not only has an impact on the level of protection, but also on the operating cost, the latency and the hard- and software requirements. Encryption mode and encryption standard together define the frame format, which is the interface between encryptor and network and between the encrypted frame and the underlying network.



Not all vendors support all encryption modes and there are important differences in the implementation of replay and integrity protection.


The encryption mode often has an impact on the scalability. A multipoint WAN can theoretically consist of thousands of sites, with the traffic between the sites handled by an encryptor at every site. In reality such large networks will be impossible to find, as a reasonable segmentation is the foundation for frictionless operation, efficiency and maximum security. While there are encryptors that could support an unlimited number of peers, in practice the support of up to 500 encryptors is amply sufficient. Actually, most broadband multipoint WANs consists of less than 100 peers.

The selection of the appropriate encryption mode is a question of finding the right balance between security, cost, network compatibility and overhead. The use of unauthenticated encryption is not recommended.


The frame diagrams below distort the ratio between header/CRC and payload heavily to the disadvantage of the header and checksum.

### 3.6.1. Frame Mode

Bulk encryption encrypts the entire frame including Header and CRC checksum.



*Frame mode without authenticated encryption*



*Frame mode with authenticated encryption*

Advantages:


- All frames are completely encrypted
- Tapping the line will reveal nothing concerning network and data
- Authenticated encryption generates little overhead (24-32 bytes) compared to the security gained
- If unauthenticated, there is no encryption overhead on frame level

Disadvantages:


- Needs dedicated line
- Cannot be switched
- Has higher operating cost
- Incompatible with Managed Ethernet Services

### 3.6.2. Transport Mode

Transport mode limits the encryption to the payload, the header remains in clear. Most encryptors that support this mode permit to define the starting point of the encryption. Only the header information after the encryption offset will be encrypted, so that VLAN and MPLS tags can remain in the clear. This provides the necessary transparency of the frame for Carrier Ethernet and MPLS networks. Unless there is a dedicated line, the Ethertype field will also need to remain in the clear and remapped to avoid that the frame gets thrown out by interposed switches.



*Transport mode with unauthenticated encryption*



*Transport mode with authenticated encryption*

Advantages:

- Entire layer 2 payload is encrypted
- Without explicit replay and integrity protection there is no frame overhead
- Frame-based replay and integrity protection have a excellent security/overhead ratio (only 24-32 bytes, depending on vendor)
- Can be switched
- Transparent to VLAN and MPLS (EoMPLS)

- Allows to procure bandwidth from the provider instead of leasing a dedicated line, leading to monthly cost savings of 30%+
- Compatible with Managed Ethernet Services

Disadvantages:


- Protection limited to layer 2 payload
- Tapping the line will reveal the LAN structure as the header remains in the clear
- Risk of MAC spoofing if the header or parts of it are not authenticated

### 3.6.3 Tunnel Mode

Tunnel mode encrypts the entire original frame while adding a new header and a new checksum. Sender respectively destination are the two encryptors on each side of the tunnel. The newly created frame is a standard Ethernet frame that carries the original frame as payload. The tunneling generates an overhead of 18 bytes. Authentication adds another 24-26 bytes, bringing the total up to 42-44 bytes. This increases the latency by a couple of microseconds due to the additional processing required by the process. The overall impact on the network performance remains small.



*Frame without frame-based explicit replay- and integrity protection*



*Frame with frame-based explicit replay- and integrity protection*

Advantages:


- Original frame is completely encrypted
- Can be switched
- Transparent to VLAN and MPLS
- Does not require dedicated line
- Compatible with Managed Ethernet Services

Disadvantages:

- Encryption overhead of up to 70% on frame level (with 64 byte frames), but averaging less than 10% in typical IMIX)
- Increases processing requirements
- Primarily optimized for point-to-point and point-to-multipoint
- Reduced scalability

### 3.6.4. IP-based Tunnel

It is also possible to transport Ethernet frames over IP, encapsulating an Ethernet frame as IP payload and encrypting the encapsulated Ethernet frame, or by encrypting the Ethernet frame and adding an IP header. If the entire payload is encrypted, then the protection of the payload is similar to that of a bulk encryption.



*Ethernet over IP (EoIP) over TCP with authenticated encryption*




*Ethernet over IP (EoIP) over UDP with authenticated encryption*

If within the IP tunneling the entire original Ethernet frame, then the protection of the payload is similar to that of a bulk encryption. It is also similar to an Ethernet tunnel, except that the encrypted original frame is not transported over native Ethernet, but over IP. In comparison with an Ethernet tunnel, an IP tunnel comes with more overhead and more latency. IP tunnels only make sense in environments where no layer 2 connections are available. If the transport of the encrypted frame is over IP, then also key exchange over IP must be supported.

### 3.6.5. Native IP Encryption

It is also possible to encrypt pure IP-networks from layer 2. It is however mandatory to factor in the characteristics and requirements of layer 3 networks.



Compared with IPSec-based solutions the encryption overhead is substantially lower and group key systems are available from the outset. Encryptors with native IP support are often used when a more secure and more performant alternative to GET VPN is needed.

### 3.7. Size of the Replay Window

Authenticated encryption uses a counter. The sending encryptor increases the counter reading by one for every authenticated frame he sends. At the receiving encryptor the counter reading for each incoming authenticated frame from the sending encryptor should increase by one as well. Especially in MANs and WANs it can happen, that the proper sequence is not maintained. Depending on the network quality thus a window is required, that determines, how much deviation from the standard sequence will be accepted. This window has to be small enough to still prevent replay attacks. The replay window can be either defined by the maximum permitted deviation of the counter reading or by time in seconds.

### 3.8. Selective Encryption

There are scenarios in which frames with specific characteristics should or must be treated differently than the norm. That can be e.g. frames of a VLAN that is used to provide the outside connection to the Internet or frames with an MPLS tag. All information contained in a frame can be used as criteria: VLAN-ID, CoS, MPLS tag, Ethertype and MAC address. It is also possible to use factors such as frame size. Selective encryption is a functionality that allows addresses and connections to be treated differently including exclusion from encryption. Key selection criteria are MAC address and VLAN ID. Further criteria that would be imaginable are e.g. Ethertype and CoS. Many Metro Ethernet services

are based on VLAN IDs and selective encryption by VLAN ID is required for certain services. This feature allows using a single access line for multiple services, such as Ethernet, MPLS and Internet. Such a consolidation of access lines can offer substantial cost savings. “MPLS awareness” combined with selective encryption based on the presence of an MPLS tag is required to master different MPLS scenarios.


### 3.9. Traffic Flow Security

Traffic flow security obfuscates the actual data traffic by changing frame sizes and frame sequences during transport. Traditional methods were limited to using uniform frame sizes and to dedicated point-to-point scenarios. Newer methods work with variable frame sizes and support all usage scenarios. Some of them additionally use traffic flow optimization to offset the overhead penalty and manage to maintain the same IMIX throughput in tunnel mode (Ethernet tunnel or IP tunnel) as normally only attained in authenticated transport mode.

At this time, only two platforms offer traffic flow security, with one of the implementations using the traditional method. By allowing the definition and use of an 80 bytes transport header, this implementation works over different transport networks, including IP. The other implementation uses a newer method that supports all usage scenarios (point-to-point, point-to-multipoint and multipoint-to-multipoint), works over different transport networks and includes traffic flow optimization, providing full IMIX throughput in tunnel mode.

#### 4. Control Plane Protection

Metropolitan Area (MAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) security is deployed at the edge of each site. A viable solution must provide network security and resiliency. This requires overall security and resilience, encompassing device, data plane, control plane and management plane. It is not sufficient to protect the data plane as good as possible. Encryption needs key and those keys must be exchanged between the devices. The key exchange is therefore as popular a target for an attack as the device itself, the management plane and the rest of the control plane.



A single weakness in one of those four areas will compromise security and resiliency. A secure device is the foundation. Dedicated network encryption appliances can provide the level of security and resilience required.

## 5. Auto-Discovery and Key Server

### 5.1. Auto-Discovery

Auto-discovery simplifies the initial configuration of the encryptors and the adaption to configuration changes. It allows an encryptor not only to see the other encryptors in the network, but also to detect key servers and VLANs. Once the encryptors are configured, it must be possible to disable auto-discovery and lock the configuration. It will only be needed again in case of network configuration changes.

### 5.2. Key Server

Every device that generates and distributes keys to other devices is a key server. There are different ways to implement key generation and key distribution. In case of a symmetric key system it is even possible to generate and distribute only the information necessary to calculate the key instead of the key itself.

### 5.3. Integrated Key Server

Encryptors with integrated key server do not require an additional external key server. Depending on the usage scenario and on compliance and on regulations, the additional use of an external key server can be beneficial or might even be a requirement.

### 5.4. Support for External Key Server

Depending on the usage scenario, regulations and company policies, using an external key server can be advantageous or even a requirement. External key servers can be either used to separate key management and encryption, to enhance security or to improve scalability. The separation of key management and encryption is often used in a managed encryption services scenario, in which the customers want to retain physical ownership and access to the key server, next to owning the keys.

Integrated and external key servers do not exclude each other mutually. In large networks, it can be advantageous to use a combination of integrated and external key servers. Depending on the number of master keys in use and the frequency of their change an external key server can be beneficial for the scalability. An external key server is subject to the same security requirements as an encryptor.



In the case of certificate-based asymmetric encryption an external Hardware Security Module (HSM) can serve as Certificate Authority (CA). A HSM can also be used as external key server or for key generation and key storage for virtual appliances.

Another scenario is the combination of encryptors with quantum key distribution, where the keys are generated and distributed over a separate line.

### **5.5. External Key Server**

Only a couple of vendors offer external key servers. They are normally used in large networks, managed encryption services and high-security environments and come in the form of network-attached key servers, HSMs, and QKD-devices.

### **5.6. Support for Multiple, Distributed Key Servers**

A single key server can fail and thus constitutes a single point-of-failure (SOF). Another issue is the dependency on uninterrupted availability of the connection to the encryptors to the key server. Multiple, distributed key servers allow the encryptors to maintain secure operation even if a key server fails or a connection is interrupted. For multi-tenancy scenarios with key ownership by the tenants, multiple, distributed key servers are a requirement.

### **5.7. Support for Fail-over to Backup Key Server**

In group key systems in which all group members use the same key to encrypt and decrypt frames, a group key server supplying such a shared key to all group members is required. If such a group key server fails or becomes unreachable, no further key exchange and group membership check is possible. To avoid such a scenario, group key systems normally have a hierarchy of multiple, distributed key servers. If the currently active group key server fails or becomes unreachable, the next in the hierarchy takes over.

In the case of group key systems, in which an encryptor with integrated key server only distributes the keys to decrypt the keys for frames sent by him, there is no need for a backup key server. If the encryptor fails or becomes unreachable he cannot send frames anymore and no keys are required to decrypt frames that are not sent.

## 6. Key Management

Key management is the core of every network encryption solution. It is to a large degree responsible for determining the application area and the functionality.

### 6.1. Basic Equipment

Truly random random numbers, secure key storage and autonomous operation are part of the basic equipment needed for a solution that wants to secure networks between sites. Virtual appliances can only accomplish this with the help of additional hardware, such as smartcard.

#### 6.1.1. Hardware Random Number Generator

Secure cryptographic solutions are dependent on the availability of truly random random numbers. Software can only generate pseudo-random random numbers, but no true random numbers. Secure solutions use a hardware random number generator to generate the random numbers needed for key generation.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware\\_random\\_number\\_generator](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator)

#### 6.1.2. Secure Key Storage

Keys need to be protected from unauthorized access, as the security of the system is dependent on the security of the keys. Thus, keys and initial secrets, such as shared secrets, the private key of the certificate, etc. must be stored in a secure fashion. So secure that any attempt to manipulate lead to an immediate zeroization of the entire content of the storage. The key storage must be tamper resistant.


[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper\\_resistant](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper_resistant)

#### 6.1.3. Autonomous Operation

Autonomous operation requires that the encryptor accomplish its job independently of external resources. Each external resource constitutes a risk and a dependency. Dedicated key servers, certificate authorities and dedicated security management are not considered to be external resources. Such devices should not be single points of failure, though and should be configurable in a redundant fashion.


## 6.2. Connectivity Association

Communication involves more than a single party. All participating encryptors must find each other, recognize each other and authenticate themselves mutually. Once that is accomplished there is a connectivity association between each of the participating encryptors. They are authorized to communicate with each other.



Once the connectivity association is established, a security association can be built, that determines how the two participating encryptors are communicating securely. This is accomplished using an initial secret and a key agreement protocol. The initial secret can be a pre-shared key or a certificate. In case of elliptic curve cryptography, the curve domain is also an initial secret that needs to be present. The initial secrets are stored in a secure key storage.

In the build-up from initial secret to session key multiple complex processes take place. Each of them needs to be secure by itself and in the sequence, it is being used.



Most encryptors use a hybrid approach, employing a combination of asymmetric and symmetric encryption. For the data traffic, symmetric encryption is used.

### 6.3. Authentication/Initial Secret and Signature Protocol

The encryptors must authenticate themselves to one another. This can be done either by certificates (asymmetrical) or by using pre-shared secrets (symmetrical).

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared\\_secret](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509>

Authentication using pre-shared secrets can be done between a pair of encryptors, between all members of a network, per group or per pair of encryptors in a group.

The initial secret, pre-shared secret or certificate, are used for signing in order to allow the recipient to verify the sender. The key exchange uses them to sign the keys or partial keys that are exchanged to ensure that they are coming from the correct remote device.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic\\_Curve\\_Digital\\_Signature\\_Algorithm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital\\_Signature\\_Algorithm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Signature_Algorithm)  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA>  
<http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/14654/digital-signature-using-symmetric-key-cryptography>

The signature in combination with the signature protocol is the foundation for the key exchange.

## 6.4. Key Exchange

There are two different approaches to key exchange: One is symmetrical and the other one is asymmetrical. The asymmetrical approach needs more computing power but is considered to be more secure. Some physicists, technologists and mathematicians are assuming that a quantum computer with the proper algorithms could solve the mathematical problems used as foundation for asymmetrical key exchange within minutes and that powerful quantum computers might become a reality within the next decade. A big jump in security that also prevents successful attacks by quantum computers is therefore provided by a combination of asymmetrical and symmetrical key exchange, such as the combination of Diffie-Hellman with symmetrical encryption of the partial keys. A 256 bit AES key is used as signature and makes the key exchange immune against attacks from quantum computers.

### 6.4.1. Symmetrical Key Exchange

In a symmetrical approach, all keys are directly derived from each other. First, a shared secret is entered into the encryptor. Then the encryptor generates internally a master key and encrypts the master key with the shared secret. The session key is also generated by the encryptor and is encrypted with the master key. Master key and session key are transmitted to the other encryptor in encrypted form. The big issue with this approach is the shared secret. If that shared secret ever becomes known, then all previously recorded data communication can be decrypted.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric\\_key\\_algorithm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric_key_algorithm)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric\\_key\\_management](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric_key_management)

### 6.4.2. Asymmetrical Key Exchange

In an asymmetric approach the partial keys are generated completely inside the encryptor, without any user having access to it. After exchanging the partial keys both sides calculate the same shared secret. Contrary to a symmetric approach, nobody knows the shared secret. Subsequently the encryptor generates internally the master key and encrypts it with the shared secret. The encryptor also generates the session key and uses the master key to encrypt it. The transmission of the master and session keys from one encryptor is always encrypted.

Common asymmetrical approaches are Diffie-Hellman and RSA. Diffie-Hellmann uses in its basic variant the discrete logarithm problem, which comes with the disadvantage of needing very long partial keys to be really secure. The same is true for RSA. A more state-of-the-art variant is the use of Diffie-Hellman with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC),

which provides better security with shorter partial keys. The security of ECC is heavily dependant on the curves used. Among experts the security of the NIST curves is severely in doubt. Some vendors give users the choice between NIST curves, Brainpool curves, Safe-curves and custom curves, while other support NIST curves only. The generation of secure elliptic curves is highly complex and also the proper implementation of elliptic curve cryptography is non-trivial. There are also speed differences between the different elliptic curves, but for multisite networks they do not matter.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie-Hellman>

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic\\_Curve\\_Diffie-Hellman](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Diffie-Hellman)

<http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/index.html>

<http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/links.htm>

<https://tls.mbed.org/kb/cryptography/elliptic-curve-performance-nist-vs-brainpool>

Asymmetrical approaches sign the partial keys that are exchanged to ensure that the correct remote station sends them. There are different ways to accomplish this: Either by using a certificate (X.509) in combination with appropriate procedures (RSA, DSA or ECC) or by encrypting the partial keys with a pre-shared secret.

Most systems use a hybrid approach. Session keys are always symmetric.

#### **6.4.3. Exchange Frequency**

The more frequent the sessions keys in use are replaced, the lower the probability that the key will be compromised. The security of the key does not only depend on the secrecy of the key, but also depends on the process used and the parameters chosen. The length of the counter and the ICV play an important role. E.g. in counter mode the key has to be changed before the counter starts back at 0. With group key systems is therefore required that the system automatically changes the session key after a given number of minutes. The same is true for the key encryption key (master key), which is used to encrypt the session keys. The exchange frequency is lower as it is only used to encrypt the session key and thus is used less often and encrypts less data. The regular exchange of master keys should take place automatically after a certain period of time. Key exchanges using Diffie-Hellmann are compute-intensive. Sufficient processing power of the encryptor is a requirement for keeping the lifecycle of a master key low, especially in large, complex networks.

Key Type	Change Frequency
Session Key (Data Encryption Key)	every 1 - 60 minutes
Master Key (Key Encryption Key)	every 1 -24 hours
Initial Secret	every 12 - 24 months

## 6.5. Key System


Ethernet frames come in three different variants, depending on the number of recipients of a frame:

Unicast for the communication of one MAC address with a single other MAC address

Multicast for the communication of one single MAC address with multiple MAC addresses

Broadcast for the communication of one single MAC address with all other MAC addresses

There are different approaches to ensure that next to unicast frames also multicast and broadcast frames are properly encrypted. The foundation for the key system is established on one hand by the initial secrets located in each encryptor and on the other hand by the information carried by each frame.



There are two different approaches for key systems: Pairwise keys and group keys.

For pairwise key system a network consists of a multitude of point-to-point connections. Each encryptor is connected with each other encryptor by a point-to-point connection. Traditional pairwise key systems use unidirectional keys for the connection between a pair of encryptors.

Group key systems are based on group membership and use a different key per group. There are different ways to define a group. A group can e.g. consist of a VLAN or multiple VLANs. In such a definition, the group is bidirectional. Each group member uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt frames. A group can also be defined to consist of the recipients of a sender's frames. In such a definition, the group is unidirectional. Each encryptor uses a different key to encrypt frames and the recipient uses the key provided by the sender to decrypt the frames coming from that sender. An encryptor can support multiple groups. For each of those groups he uses a different key and in the case of unidirectional groups he uses as many keys as there are members in the group.

Further it is possible to use a combination of a pairwise and a group key system. From an organizational point of view a VLAN can constitute a group, in which pairwise keys are used for unicast traffic and a group key is used for multicast and broadcast traffic. For each VLAN separate pairwise keys and a separate group key are used.


#### 6.5.1. Pairwise Keys

For a pairwise key system point-to-point connections consist of a link whose end-points are defined by the two encryptors A and B. For the encryption of the data flowing from A to B the encryptor uses key AB. In the opposite direction, from B to A, the encryptor uses key BA.




Pairwise keys systems are designed for point-to-point connections and therefore also treat point-to-multipoint and multipoint networks as an accumulation of point-to-point connections.





Pairwise key systems are designed for point-to-point connections and function only with unicast frames, as unicast frames are limited to a single destination, unless a point-to-multipoint topology is set up as an accumulation of separate point-to-point links with individual multicast and broadcast frames. Multicast and broadcast frames have a single sender, but multiple destination addresses. This spells trouble for pairwise key systems as there are no pairwise keys for a frame with multiple destinations. By definition a pair is limited to two and that means that there can only be a single destination. E.g. there is no key available for encryptor A to encrypt a multicast frame for two different destination encryptors (B and C) and that would also be available for the destination encryptors to decrypt the frame.

Pairwise key systems also treat multipoint-to-multipoint topologies the same way they treat point-to-point connections.



There are four different solution approaches for this problem: (1) Leave multicast and broadcast frames unencrypted, (2) replicate multicast and broadcast frames for every connection and then treat them as unicast frames, (3) add a specialized key system take care of multicast and broadcast frames, and (4) use a key system that can handle unicast, multicast and broadcast frames.


The first approach – exempting multicast and broadcast frames from encryption – leads to an unacceptable result, as there would be no security for multicast and broadcast frames. The second approach – the replication of the multicast and broadcast frames across all connections – leads to a substantial surplus load for the network. This causes either higher operating costs or a reduced network performance. Neither of those two effects can be considered desirable. The third solution – the use of a second key system – results in two different and competing key systems, but solves the problem concerning multicast and broadcast frames. Depending on the frame type the responsibility lies with one key system or the other. A group key system is used for the multicast and broadcast frames, while the pairwise key system handles the unicast frames. The fourth approach is the most efficient: A key system that can handle unicast, multicast and broadcast frames.

### 6.5.2. Group Keys


Group keys are based on the principle that for the communication within a defined group the same key is used to encrypt the communication. The membership in one group does not exclude a member from concurrent membership in other groups. For the communica-

tion within different groups different keys are used. Keys are unique to a group and separate the groups cryptographically. A group consists of two or more members. For Ethernet networks, group assignment is mostly based on the VLAN tag,


This works for all three basic topologies, starting with point-to-point:



In point-to-multipoint scenarios there are two different approaches: The network members can be treated as single group.




Or each connection between the hub and a spoke is treated as a single group.




It is also possible to use a mix between the two approaches.

In multipoint-to-multipoint topologies group key system allow the layering of different groups. Such a group can e.g. consist of the members of a VLAN. If that VLAN covers all sites, then all sites are members of this group, unless specific sites are excluded despite containing members of the VLAN.



If a VLAN only covers a limited number of sites, then only these sites are member of this group.




Multipoint connections often are groups that share a common broadcast domain. Within a group all data traffic is encrypted with the same session key. There is no differentiation between unicast, multicast and broadcast frames.

Powerful group key systems allow the establishment of group membership through parameters such as VLAN-IDs. Such group key systems normally use a redundant key server setup or are set up in a distributed way. The key server takes care of providing the right group keys to each participating encryption, so that the group members can communicate across sites. Another task of the key server is to ensure that a new key is generated and put in use if there is any change in the membership of the group. With the new key the old data traffic cannot be decrypted and with the old key the new data traffic cannot be decrypted. This is also known as perfect forward and perfect backwards secrecy.

For Ethernet networks, it seems to be a natural fit to organize the groups according to VLAN-IDs as corporate networks tend to limit the broadcast domains by using VLANs and use those VLANs also to segment the network. A group key encryption that uses the VLAN-IDs for group membership reinforces that segmentation and establishes a cryptographic separation of the VLANs.

Not all group key systems use bidirectional keys for the encryption of the data traffic. It is also possible to use unidirectional group keys. In such group key system, the sending encryption generates the key he will use for encrypting the outgoing frames and distributes this key to all group members that are part of his group. As every group member is also a sending encryption, every group member distributes the key he is using for encrypting his outgoing data traffic to all other group members. In such a scenario, each encryption is also the key server for his keys.



Each platform vendor uses a different key system and thus a different approach. Some key systems are rather device-oriented whereas others additionally offer support for existing network hierarchies and structure. Full multi-tenancy support requires support for network hierarchies, structures and segmentation combined with a group key system with distributed key servers combined with full key ownership – including initial secrets – by the tenant.

## 7. Network Support

### 7.1. Bump-in-the-Wire Deployment

Bump-in-the-wire deployment capability characterizes an encryptor that can be added to a network without requiring changes in the network infrastructure.

### 7.2. Jumbo Frames

The support of jumbo frames should be a matter of course (>1500 bytes) as it is a standard feature of Ethernet network interfaces. Jumbo Frames are normally used at bandwidths of 100Mbit/sec and higher.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jumbo\\_frames](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jumbo_frames)

### 7.3. Ethernet Flow Control

Ethernet Flow Control supports lossless transmission by regulating the traffic flow to avoid dropped frames in case of congestion. This is done by pausing and resuming the network traffic between two nodes on a full-duplex Ethernet network. Flow control prevents buffer overflow on the two involved encryptors. Buffer overflow causes dropped frames. The PAUSE command can stop the transmission of data temporarily to avoid congestion.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet\\_flow\\_control](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_flow_control)

<http://datacenteroverlords.com/2013/02/02/ethernet-congestion-drop-it-or-pause-it/>

### 7.4. Fragmentation

Fragmentation/defragmentation for Ethernet works differently than the fragmentation of IPv4. It helps where the frame would exceed an MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit) size of 1500 bytes, respectively another MTU size defined by the network. Most Carrier Ethernet networks do not have any issue with an additional overhead of up to 32 bytes. Additionally, there is the possibility to use an upstream traffic shaper to reduce the frame size to the maximum allowed. If the communication is between IPv6 devices, the reduction occurs automatically.

### **7.5. Dead Peer Detection**

The function „dead peer detection“ enables the encryptor to find out and alert if the remote station stops working.

### **7.6. Optical Loss Pass-Through**

Optical loss-pass-through (also known as link loss return) supports the discovery of link problems on the fiber port. If the receiver of the fiber port gets no valid link signal, the sender of the fiber port suspends his activity. This function permits a switch or router to see through the encryptor and thus check if the connection to the switch or router behind the encryptor on the remote side of the connection works properly.

### **7.7. Link Loss Carry Forward**

Link loss carry forward only sends a link signal if a link signal is received. The loss of the link is passed on to the switch or router, so that it becomes immediately known. The output port of the encryptor only sends a link signal if he gets a link signal on the input port and the input port of the encryptor only sends a link signal if he gets a link signal on the output port.

Link loss carry forward can be used for fiberoptic and copper networks.



## 8. System Management

### 8.1. Out-of-Band Management

It is necessary to be able to configure and control the encryptor. For out-of-band management a separate Ethernet port and a serial port are standard.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Out-of-band\\_management](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Out-of-band_management)

### 8.2. In-Band Management

In-band management of the encryptors can be supported by using methods such as SSH (Secure Shell), TLS, Corba/TLS, SNMP or by using proprietary protocols.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure\\_Shell](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell)

### 8.3. Slots and Ports

It is necessary to be able to configure and control the encryptor. For out-of-band management a separate Ethernet port and a serial port are standard.

### 8.4. SNMP

All vendors support the monitoring of the encryptors in the network using SNMP. It is important to realize that SNMP is only halfway secure and supports the 64 bit counters required for high-speed network devices from version 2c on. Encryption is only supported in v3.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNMP>

The monitoring of the link status requires that the encryptor continuously publishes his operating status. SNMP monitoring software can read and process these status reports and thus monitor the current link status. This can be accomplished by setting SNMP traps for the uplink and the downlink.

## 8.5. Logs

The event log registers all events and is local.

The audit log registers all events that are relevant for the audit and stores them locally.

Syslog registers system messages. UDP is used for the transmission between Syslog server and encryptor, which means that neither transmission nor registration of the data is guaranteed. For that reason, the encryptor needs the local event and audit logs. Syslog support also permits to integrate the encryptors into centralized log management environments.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer\\_data\\_logging](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_data_logging)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audit\\_trail](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audit_trail)

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syslog>

## **9. Unit**

### **9.1. Rack Unit**

The rack unit refers to the height that the unit occupies in a standard 19“ rack. 1U stands for one rack unit and single-height, whereas 2U stands for two rack units and double height.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rack\\_unit](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rack_unit)

### **9.2. Device Access**

The rack unit refers to the height that the unit occupies in a standard 19“ rack. 1U stands for one rack unit and single-height, whereas 2U stands for two rack units and double height.

### **9.3. Redundant Power Supplies**

Encryptors are an important part of the IT infrastructure. It is common to connect those devices to two different power circuits, so that there is no interruption in case of one of the power circuits going down.

Redundant power supplies can be connected to two different power circuits. If they are hot-swappable, they can be exchanged during operation. The power supplies used by the encryptors normally have a MTBF that is substantially higher than the MTBF of the device itself. This makes the actual breakdown of a power supply statistically very unlikely.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uninterruptible\\_power\\_supply](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uninterruptible_power_supply)

### **9.4. Mean Time between Failures**

MTBF indicates the theoretical duration between two failures. The higher the value, the lower the theoretical operating cost. One could argue that minimum values above 60'000 hours show overly inflationary tendencies, especially as these are not proven, but calculated theoretical values.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MTBF>

## 9.5. High Availability

High availability functionality permits the redundant layout of the encryptors.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-availability\\_cluster](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-availability_cluster)

## 9.6. Device Protection

Tamper evident and tamper resistant are the two different categories used for the casing. Tamper resistant is much harder to accomplish and thus more expensive. Tamper evident can be accomplished with a seal consisting of a sticker.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper\\_proof](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper_proof)  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper\\_evident](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamper_evident)

## 9.7. Security Approvals

There are many different IT security guidelines for encryption products. Some are international, some are national and others are international but use national criteria. Some countries have defined their own requirements for IT security for encryptors. In these countries, a certification for fulfilling these requirements is a precondition for the sale of such a product to governments or administrations. Most of these certifications only have limited benefit for the customers as often neither the requirements nor the depth of the examination provide a sufficient security. It is up to the customer to read the protection profile and the certification report in full detail and make the comparison with his own security requirements. It is important to understand and take into consideration that certification standards such as US Common Criteria using standardized protection profiles for EAL2+ are not driven by state-of-the art security. Most often, commercial interest of US-based vendors, certification labs, and certification consultants combined with national interests play a more important role than basic security requirements.

A certification of devices for government use by state organizations tend to have more value than a certification by commercial service providers, as the devices must meet the requirements for classified government networks. In real life those certifications do not guarantee absolute security either, but you can be assured that the device design and development has been under scrutiny from cryptographers, mathematicians and security experts since the beginning. The examination of the final products tends to be rather detailed as well. Such a combined expertise can rarely be found with commercial service providers. The German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik has the reputation of being especially demanding for products that are examined and tested following

the guidelines of the “IT-Grundschutz” for use by the German government. The technical guidelines published by BSI also tend to be more security-focused and strict compared to some of the NIST requirements. For all certifications, what matters is who examined and tested what where and how and according to which protection profile and guidelines.

Frameworks, standards and guidelines are issued by different national and international organizations. It is preferable, if a product is not limited to the national standards of a single country, but supports a range of internationally accepted standards.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common\\_Criteria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Criteria)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundesamt\\_für\\_Sicherheit\\_in\\_der\\_Informationstechnik](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundesamt_für_Sicherheit_in_der_Informationstechnik)

[http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue\\_tc/catalogue\\_tc\\_browse.htm?commid=45306](http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=45306)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIPS\\_140](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIPS_140)

<http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/clusters/security>

## 9.8. Security Relevant Approvals

Next to the actual security certifications there are also security relevant approvals. These cover the areas of operational security and emissions.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_standards](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_standards)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_EN\\_standards](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_EN_standards)

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FCC>

## 10. Management Software

The management software supplied with the encryptors can hardly be compared as each vendor supports a different feature set on his encryptor and the functionalities to be managed decide what has to be supported by the software. Embedded web servers are harder to secure than standalone applications.

### 10.1. Management Access

Not everybody needs to have access to all the different management functions, especially if you want to keep network and security management separated. Such a separation is a pre-condition for Managed Security Services and Managed Encryption Services. The authentication of the user is based on the user identity, while the access is granted according to the role of the user. Typical roles include crypto officer, network management, maintenance and user). A minimum number of two hierarchy levels of roles is required.

A strict internal separation of users is difficult to achieve, as it also requires a separate memory space for each user.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role-based\\_access\\_control](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role-based_access_control)

### 10.2. Device Management

This category covers device management, device diagnostics, network diagnostics and link monitoring.

Device diagnostic utilities provide the health status of the device and help to pinpoint problem areas, while network diagnostics are needed to monitor and troubleshoot network connections. A remote update/upgrade facility allows keeping the devices up-to-date without local intervention.

### 10.3. Certificate Authority and Management

Pre-shared keys can be a viable alternative to the use of certificates and a PKI and even have some distinct advantages if implemented properly. Products that are using certificates need a certificate authority (CA), so that the required X.509 certificates can be created independently of an existing CA structure. The certificate management must cover creation, issue, revocation, etc. of certificates.

The use of non-standard X.509 certificates prevents the use of an existing CA infrastructure for the encryptors.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate\\_authority](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority)

#### **10.4. Key Management**

Key management is responsible for the generation and management of the master and session keys, selective encryption and key assignment.

For group key systems, it also includes the group creation, group isolation and the fail-over configuration.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key\\_management](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_management)

## 11. Price and Warranty

### 11.1. Price

Shown are the list prices. These are now much closer to the actual prices paid than they used to be. Project prices can differ depending on project size. Prices are not necessarily proportional to the functionality and quality of a device.

Some vendors compensate inflated list prices with corresponding discounts, while others work with realistic list prices and correspondingly lower discounts. At the end, it is the price paid that counts and not the discount. The prices are now in a region that facilitates a buy decision. For devices with a full-duplex throughput of 1Gb/s they are now between €13'000 and €20'000, for 10Gb/s full-duplex they are now between €24'000 and €30'000 and for 100Mb/s they are around €6'000. Compact units without redundant power supplies are – depending on platform and vendor – 20-50% below the list prices for 19" appliances with redundant power supplies. A price lower by 50% normally indicates a price at the upper edge of the spread for the 19" appliance. Those prices are for complete and secure systems, including authentication, key management and real-time encryption.

Many vendors do prefer not to see their pricing information published. The pricing spreads shown above do take all the different pricings – published or not - in count.

### 11.2. Operating Cost

The price paid for the unit is just one element on the cost side. With an average operating life of 6-8 years or more, the operating cost make up for an important part of the overall cost. The operating cost themselves consist of direct operating cost of the unit (warranty, warranty coverage, warranty extension, SLA, etc.) and the line cost paid to the telecom operator. Devices that support line consolidation might reduce line cost substantially. If costs are calculated properly, line cost is an important cost element.

Operating cost is harder to calculate than the device cost, as opportunity cost has to be taken into consideration as well. E.g. if more expensive networks have to be used because the encryptor doesn't function properly with a less costly transport network.

### 11.3. Warranty and Warranty Coverage

Vendors differ in terms of warranty period and warranty coverage. Different cost structures can account for hidden price differences that can be 10-20%.



The author would like to thank all the people that made this market overview possible:

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**Atmedia**

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates							
Virtual Appliance	10 Mbps	✓	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+
	100 Mbps	✓	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/SFP	✓/OSFP
	1 Gbps	✓	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/SFP	✓/OSFP28
	10 Gbps	✓	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/R/L45	✓/SFP	✓/OSFP28
	25Gbps	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓/OSFP28
	40 Gbps	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓/OSFP28
	100 Gbps	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓/OSFP28
Virtual Appliance							
Virtual Appliance							
Supported Network Topologies							
Point-to-Point (P2P) Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) Multipoint (MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies							
Port-based	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VLAN-based	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)							
Ethernet MPLS IP v4/v6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)							
Ethernet (native) MPLS (ECMP/LS) IP v4/IP v6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TCP UDP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios							
Single tenant Multi-tenant	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Self-managed Managed encryption service Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform							
Platform used	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia
	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia
Key Management							
Mainboard/Firmware							

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher
	Preferred Mode of Operation
Processing Method	Alternative Mode of Operation
	Key Length (in bit)
cutthrough	
store&forward	
Encryption Hardware	
FPGA	
ASIC	
CPU	
Latency	
Latency P2P Mode	cutthrough
Latency MP Mode	store & forward
Latency MIP Mode	cutthrough
	store & forward

Encryption Modes

Native Ethernet Encryption

Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)	
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Transport (Payload only)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Definable encryption offset (fixed)
	Variable encryption offset
	Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content
	Ethertype mutation (unauthenticated encryption only)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	

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AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM
256	256	256	256	256	256	256	256
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N/A	<42µs	<8µs	<42µs	<8µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs
N/A	<43µs	<9µs	<43µs	<9µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs
N/A	<48µs	<9µs	<48µs	<9µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s 8	0-30s 8	0-30s 8	0-30s 8	0-30s 8	0-30s 8	0-30s 8	0-30s 8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
unlimited	256	unlimited	unlimited	256	unlimited	256	unlimited
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

\*IMX=100%

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support

Native IP Encryption

Supported IP versions
IPv4
IPv6
Supported transmission protocols
TCP
UDP
Transport Tunnel Mode
Maximum number of peers
Maximum number of IP addresses
Maximum number of multicast groups
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Additional Authenticated Data (header)
Replay Protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

Selective Encryption

Based on MAC Address
Based on VLAN ID
Based on Ethertype
Based on Multicast Group
Based on Presence of MPLS Tag
Based on IP Address
Combination of multiple selection criteria

Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on VLAN ID
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP

Traffic Masking

Traffic Flow Security
-----------------------

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✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
native IP/UDP	native IP/UDP	native IP/UDP	native IP/UDP	native IP/UDP	native IP/UDP	native IP/UDP
2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
Max. number of MAC addresses	Max. number of MAC addresses	Max. number of MAC addresses	Max. number of MAC addresses	Max. number of MAC addresses	Max. number of MAC addresses	Max. number of MAC addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs	Max. number of VLAN IDs	Max. number of VLAN IDs	Max. number of VLAN IDs	Max. number of VLAN IDs	Max. number of VLAN IDs	Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection	Replay protection	Replay protection	Replay protection	Replay protection	Replay protection	Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	Ethernet multi-hop support	Ethernet multi-hop support	Ethernet multi-hop support	Ethernet multi-hop support	Ethernet multi-hop support	Ethernet multi-hop support

\*MIX=100%

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
Max. number of peers	Max. number of peers	Max. number of peers	Max. number of peers	Max. number of peers	Max. number of peers	Max. number of peers
Max. number of IP addresses	Max. number of IP addresses	Max. number of IP addresses	Max. number of IP addresses	Max. number of IP addresses	Max. number of IP addresses	Max. number of IP addresses
Max. number of multicast groups	Max. number of multicast groups	Max. number of multicast groups	Max. number of multicast groups	Max. number of multicast groups	Max. number of multicast groups	Max. number of multicast groups
Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)	Authentication length (bytes)
Additional Authenticated Data (header)	Additional Authenticated Data (header)	Additional Authenticated Data (header)	Additional Authenticated Data (header)	Additional Authenticated Data (header)	Additional Authenticated Data (header)	Additional Authenticated Data (header)
Replay Protection	Replay Protection	Replay Protection	Replay Protection	Replay Protection	Replay Protection	Replay Protection
Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)	Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)	Counter length (in bytes)
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
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✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

N/A**	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
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Auto-discovery

- Auto-discovery of network endpoints
- Auto-discovery of key servers
- Auto-discovery of VLANs
- Deadlisting of auto-discovery

Key Server

- Integrated Key Server
- Support for external Key Server
- External Key Server
- Support for multiple distributed Key Servers
- Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
- Autonomous operation

Key Management

Key Generation and Storage

- Hardware Random Number Generation
- Tamper Security Key Storage (tamper-evident or tamper-proof)

Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)

- RSA
  - Key length
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
  - Key length
- Supported Curves:
  - NIST
  - Brainpool
  - Custom Curves

Hash Algorithms

- SHA-2
  - Key length
- CBC-MAC-GCM
  - Key length

Device Authentication

- Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)
  - Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor
  - Key length

- Asymmetric Signature: Certificate
  - Maximum number of certificates per encryptor
  - Key length

- Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual)
- Signature key protocol

Key Agreement and Key Exchange

- Master Key (KEK) Agreement
- Master Key (KEK) Exchange Protocol
- Automatic Change of Master Key
- Minimum suggested time interval for Master Key Change (min)
- Separate Master Key (KEK) per site
- Separate Master Key (KEK) per group
- Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement
- Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol
- Automatic Change of Session Keys
- Minimum Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)

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✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

with SC/HSM with SC/HSM: TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP
-----------------------------------	------------	------------	------------	------------	------------	------------	------------	------------	------------

N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256	512/256
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

512	512	512	512	512	512	512	512	512	512
256	256	256	256	256	256	256	256	256	256

512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256	512 (recommended: 18) 256
optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512	optional 64 (recommended: 18) 512
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***	AES-MAC/ECDSA***

\*\*\*ECDSA optional for use with optional certificates

ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia	ECKAS-DH**** atmedia
60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

\*\*\*\*NIST, Brainpool or custom curves with 256 to 521 bit length



**Atmedia**

## Network Support

- Bump in the Wire deployment
- Jumbo Frame Support
- Ethernet Flow Control via PAUSE
- Ethernet Fragmentation/Defragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multipoint
  - Multipoint
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Pass-Through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

IPv4	Out-of-band Management	RS-232V.24
IPv6		Separate Ethernet port
	Smart Card (Secure Card) Support	
	USB Port	
	In-band Management	
		SSH
		SNMP (read-only/read-write)
		TLS
		Proprietary
Remote Monitoring (SNMP)		

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- Syslog Support (Server)

## Unit

Height in 19' Rack	Number of external unencrypted Ethernet ports
Physical Device Access	Redundant Power Supply
Redundant Power Supply	Redundant, hot-swappable power supply
High Availability/Functionality (two-node cluster)	MTBF
Temper. Security	Security Approvals
Security Approvals	Safety Approvals
Boot Time	
	Cold boot until operational
	Warm boot until operational

Category	Item	Value	Unit	Notes
Category A	Item A1	100	kg	Standard weight
	Item A2	250	kg	Heavy item
	Item A3	500	kg	Medium weight
	Item A4	750	kg	Light weight
	Item A5	1000	kg	Standard weight
	Item A6	1250	kg	Heavy item
	Item A7	1500	kg	Medium weight
	Item A8	1750	kg	Light weight
Category B	Item B1	200	kg	Standard weight
	Item B2	400	kg	Heavy item
	Item B3	600	kg	Medium weight
	Item B4	800	kg	Light weight
	Item B5	1000	kg	Standard weight
	Item B6	1200	kg	Heavy item
	Item B7	1400	kg	Medium weight
	Item B8	1600	kg	Light weight
Category C	Item C1	300	kg	Standard weight
	Item C2	600	kg	Heavy item
	Item C3	900	kg	Medium weight
	Item C4	1200	kg	Light weight
	Item C5	1500	kg	Standard weight
	Item C6	1800	kg	Heavy item
	Item C7	2100	kg	Medium weight
	Item C8	2400	kg	Light weight

[illegible]

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unrestricted N/A	1	1	1	1	1	1
dependent on answer dependent on server	back	back	front	front	front	front
1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1	1:1
N/A	> 50.00%	> 50.00%	> 50.00%	> 50.00%	> 50.00%	> 50.00%
N/A	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP

NA	BSI VS-ND, NA to restricted, EU Restrict (Including 2nd Evaluation by NL)	*****
NA	EN55032 Class B, FCC Part 15 Class B, ROHS	*****

N/A	255 273	255 273	255 273	255 273	255 273
N/A	273	273	273	273	273

\*\*\*\*\*BSI VS-NfD, NATO restricted and EU Restrict planned/in preparation

Management Software

User Interface	Native PC application Embedded Webapp CLI
Initial Device Set-up	Local (out-of-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Device Configuration	Local (out-of-band) Remote (in-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Management Access	Role-based access Identify-based authentication of user Number of hierarchy levels Number of roles Strict internal separation of users
Device Management	Device Diagnostics Link Monitoring (SNMP) Connection Diagnostics In-band Network Diagnostics Remote Update Upgrade
Certificate Authority & Management	Certificate Creation Certificate Management
Key Management	Group creation Group isolation Key assignment Fail-over configuration
Price	
List Price Encryption Unit (in €)	
Per external Key Server (in €); optional, no requirement	
Required Management Software	2-10 encryptions 11-25 encryptions 26-50 encryptions 51+ encryptions
Warranty Period (months)	
Warranty Coverage	Parts & Work Basic Support (6 to 5, e-mail, phone) Software updates and upgrades
Warranty Extension (per year)	

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

optional	optional	optional	optional	optional	optional	optional	optional
optional	optional	optional	optional	optional	optional	optional	optional

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Price

on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
included	included	included	included	included	included	included	included
included	included	included	included	included	included	included	included
included	included	included	included	included	included	included	included
24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request



Gemalto

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates		Safenet CN4010	Safenet CN4020	Safenet CN6010	Safenet CN6100	Safenet CN8000	Safenet CN9100	Safenet CN9120
10 Mbps 100 Mbps 1 Gbps 10 Gbps 25Gbps 40 Gbps 100 Gbps  Virtual Appliance	✓ /RJ45	✓ /SFP	✓ /RJ45/SFP	✓ /SFP	✓ /SFP+	✓ /SFP+	✓ /CFP4	✓ /QSFP-28
	✓ /RJ45	✓ /SFP	✓ /RJ45/SFP	✓ /SFP	✓ /SFP+	✓ /SFP+		
	✓ /RJ45	✓ /SFP	✓ /RJ45/SFP	✓ /SFP	✓ /SFP+	✓ /SFP+		
Supported Network Topologies								
Point-to-Point (P2P) Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) Multipoint (MP)		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies								
Port-based  Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line) Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree) Ethernet Private LAN (EP-LAN)		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VLAN-based  Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EV-Line) Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree) Ethernet Virtual Private LAN (EVP-LAN)		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)	Ethernet MPLS (MP,SOE) IPv4/IPv6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)								
Ethernet (native) MPLS (EoMPLS) IPv4/IPv6  TCP UDP		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios								
Single tenant Multi-tenant  Self-managed Managed encryption service Managed security service		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ /one tenant per port	✓	✓
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform								
Platform used  Mainboard/Firmware Key Management		Safenet/Safenet Safenet	Safenet/Safenet Safenet	Safenet/Safenet Safenet	Safenet/Safenet Safenet	Safenet/IDQuantique Safenet	Safenet/Safenet Safenet	Safenet/Safenet Safenet

\* IP support only in combination with TRANSEC and limited to P2P. Additional overhead and latency.  
\* Multi-tenancy support based on certificates. Requires common trust domain of CAs.

## Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	
Block Cipher	Preferred Mode of Operation
Alternative Mode of Operation	Key Length (in bits)
Processing Method	
cut-through	store&forward
Encryption Hardware	
FGPA	ASIC
CPU	
Latency	
Latency P2P Mode	out-through
Latency MP Mode	store & forward
Latency P2P Mode	out-through
store & forward	
Encryption Modes	
Native Ethernet Encryption	
Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	
Integrity protection (algorithm)	
Authentication length (bytes)	
Reply protection	
Variable replay window (size)	
Counter length (in bytes)	
Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)	
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)	
Ethernet multi-hop support	
Transport (Payload only)	
Max. number of peers	
Max. number of MAC Addresses	
Max. number of VLAN IDs	
Integrity protection (algorithm)	
Authentication length (bytes)	
Reply protection	
Variable replay window (size)	
Definable encryption offset (fixed)	
Variable encryption offset:	
Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content	
Ethernet mutation	
Counter length (in bytes)	
Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)	
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption (AE))	
Ethernet multi-hop support	
Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	
Max. number of peers	
Max. number of MAC Addresses	
Max. number of VLAN IDs	
Integrity protection (algorithm)	
Authentication length (bytes)	
Reply protection	
Variable replay window (size)	
Counter length (in bytes)	
Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)	
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption (AE))	
Ethernet multi-hop support	

## Gemalto

AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES CTR 128/256	AES CTR 128/256
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<10µs (@1Gbps) * <10µs (@1Gbps)	<10µs (@1Gbps) * <10µs (@1Gbps)	<10µs * <10µs	<5µs * <5µs	<5µs * <5µs	<2µs * <2µs	<2µs * <2µs	<2µs * <2µs
* GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017
8 (CTR) + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) ✓			
✓ 512 4000/unlimited 256 GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 256 GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 256 GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 512 GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 512 GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 512 GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 512 GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 16 ✓ 256 frames	✓ 512 4000/unlimited 512 GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 16 ✓ 256 frames
✓ 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	✓ 5 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	✓ 5 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	✓ 5 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	✓ 5 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	✓ 5 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	✓ 5 5 8 (CTR) 24* ✓	✓ 5 5 8 (CTR) 24* ✓
* 2 unlimited unlimited GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* 2 unlimited unlimited GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* 2 unlimited unlimited GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* 2 unlimited unlimited GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* 2 unlimited unlimited GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017
24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 8 (CTR) ✓	24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 8 (CTR) ✓	24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 8 (CTR) ✓	24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 8 (CTR) ✓	24 + tunnel (mn, 18 bytes) 8 (CTR) ✓			

\* except for CN9100/CN9120 store & forward only in combination with TRANSEC. Frame mode, tunnel mode and EoIP only when using TRANSEC. Frame mode not native. Additional overhead and latency.

## Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC Addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Rapidly protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption) (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support

## Native IP Encryption

Supported IP versions
IPv4
IPv6
Supported transmission protocols
TCP
UDP
Transport/ Tunnel Mode
Maximum number of peers
Maximum number of IP addresses
Maximum number of multicast groups
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Additional Authenticated Data (header)
Flexibly Protection
Variable reply window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Packets overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

## Selective Encryption

- Based on MAC Address
- Based on VLAN ID
- Based on Ethertype
- Based on Multicast Group
- Based on Presence of MPLS Tag
- Based on IP Address
- Combination of multiple selection criteria

## Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on WLAN ID

- MPLS
- EoIP
- IP

Based on presence of MPLS tag

- MPLS
- EoIP
- IP

Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag

- MPLS
- EoIP
- IP

## Traffic Masking

## Traffic Flow Security

# Gemalto

	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UDP/TCP</li> <li>2</li> <li>unlimited</li> <li>unlimited</li> <li>GCM</li> <li>16</li> <li>✓</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UDP/TCP</li> <li>2</li> <li>unlimited</li> <li>unlimited</li> <li>GCM</li> <li>16</li> <li>✓</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UDP/TCP</li> <li>2</li> <li>unlimited</li> <li>unlimited</li> <li>GCM</li> <li>16</li> <li>✓</li> </ul>
256 frames 5 8 (CTF) + tunnel (rm, 38 bytes) 24 + tunnel (rm, 38 bytes) ✓	256 frames 5 8 (CTF) + tunnel (rm, 38 bytes) 24 + tunnel (rm, 38 bytes) ✓	256 frames 5 8 (CTF) + tunnel (rm, 38 bytes) 24 + tunnel (rm, 38 bytes) ✓

Age Group	Male (%)	Female (%)
18-24	50	50
25-34	50	50
35-44	50	50
45-54	50	50
55-64	50	50

	✓	✓	✓	✓	Roadmap Q4 2017	Roadmap Q4 2017
✓						

Auto-discovery

Auto-discovery of network encryptions
Auto-discovery of Key servers
Auto-discovery of VLANs
Disabling of auto-discovery

Key Server

Integrated Key Server
Support for external Key Server
External Key Server
Support for multiple distributed Key Servers
Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
Autonomous operation

Key Management

Key Generation and Storage
Hardware Random Number Generation
Tamper Security Key Storage (tamper-evident or tamper-proof)

Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)

RSA
Key length
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Key length
Supported Curves:
NIST
Brainpool
Custom Curves

Hash Algorithms

SHA-2
Key length

Device Authentication

Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)
Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor
Key length

Asymmetric Signature: Certificate
Maximum number of certificates per encryptor
Key length

Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual)
Signature key protocol

Key Agreement and Key Exchange

Master Key (KEK) Agreement
Master Key (KEK) Exchange Protocol
Automatic Change of Master Key
Minimum suggested Time Interval for Master Key Change (min)
Separate Master Key (KEK) per site
Separate Master Key (KEK) per group
Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement
Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol
Automatic Change of Session Keys
Minimum Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)

Gemalto

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

2048	2048	2048	2048	2048	2048	2048
512	512	512	512	512	512	512
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

512	512	512	512	512	512	512
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)	x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)	x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)	x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)	x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)	x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)	x.509 64 512 (ECG)/2048 (RSA)
ECDSA/RSA	ECDSA/RSA	ECDSA/RSA	ECDSA/RSA	ECDSA/RSA	ECDSA/RSA	ECDSA/RSA
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓	ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓	ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓	ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓	ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓	ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓	ECDH/RSA Serials 1440 ✓
ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓



**Gemalto**

## Network Support

- Burns in the Wire deployment
- Jumpo Frame Support
- Ethernet Non Control via PAUSE
- Ethernet Fragmentation/Defragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multipoint
  - Multipoint
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Pass-through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

- IPv4
- IPv6
- Out-of-band Management
  - RS-232C/24
  - Separate Ethernet Port
  - Smart Card (Secure Card Support)
  - USB Port
- In-band Management
  - SSH
  - SNMP (read-only/read-write)
  - TLS
  - Proprietary
- Remote Monitoring (SNMP)

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- Syslog Support (Server)

## Unit

Height in 17' Rack	Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports
Physical Device Access	Redundant Power Supply
Redundant, hot-swappable power supply	High Availability (two-node cluster)
MTBF	Tamper Security
Security Approvals	Safety Approvals
Boot Time	
Cold boot until operational (P/P)	Warm boot until operational (P/P)

Age Group	Percentage
18-24	18%
25-34	22%
35-44	25%
45-54	20%
55-64	15%

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Frequency	Count
Never	1
Rarely	1
Sometimes	1
Often	1
Very often	1

Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW
✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW	✓ ✓ RO/RW

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Age Group	Male (%)	Female (%)
18-24	55	45
25-34	50	50
35-44	45	55
45-54	40	60
55-64	35	65

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Desktop 1 back	Desktop 1 back	1U 1 front	1U 1 front	4U 1-10 front	1U 1 front	1U 1 front
Rollmap 2017 > 200.000h TE/TP	Rollmap 2017 > 200.000h TE/TP	Rollmap 2017 > 200.000h TE/TP	Rollmap 2017 > 200.000h TE/TP	Rollmap 2017 > 100.000h TE/TP	Rollmap 2017 > 200.000h TE/TP	Rollmap 2017 > 200.000h TE/TP

[illegible]

\* For CN 9100 CC EAL2+ in progress, for CN 9120, FIPS 140-2 L3 and CC EAL2+ planned. For both: UC APL and NATO planned

[illegible]

Gemalto

Management Software

User Interface	Native PC application Embedded Webapp CLI
Initial Device Setup	Local (out-of-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Device Configuration	Local (out-of-band) Remote (in-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Management Access	Role-based access Identity-based authentication of user Number of hierarchy levels Number of roles Strict internal separation of users
Device Management	Device Diagnostics Link Monitoring (SNMP) Connection Diagnostics In-band Network Diagnostics Remote Update/Upgrade
Certificate Authority & Management	Certificate Creation Certificate Management
Key Management	Group creation Group isolation Key assignment Fail-over configuration
Price	List Price Encryption Unit (in €) Per external Key Server (in €); optional, no requirement, starting price Required Management Software Optional SMC Software 1-4 encryptions 5-10 encryptions 11-20 encryptions unlimited Warranty Period (months) Warranty Coverage Parts & Work Basic Support (9 to 5, e-mail, phone) Software updates and upgrades Warranty Extension (per year)

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)	3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)	3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)	3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)	3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)	3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)	3 (SMC)/4 (CM7)
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

on request on request CM7 included	on request on request CM7 included	on request on request CM7 included	on request on request CM7 included	on request on request CM7 included	on request on request CM7 included	on request on request CM7 included
free	free	free	free	free	free	free
on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request

12	12	12	12	12	12	12
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%

\* Additionally available: Premium support (24x7 support, Advance RMA) with Plus Maintenance

Idquantique

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates		Centauris CN4010	Centauris CN4020	Centauris CN6010	Centauris CN6100	Centauris CN8000	Centauris CN9100	Centauris CN9120
Line Interface/Supported Line Rates	10 Mbps	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/RJ45/SFP	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP-28
	100 Mbps	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45/SFP	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/CFP-4	
	1 Gbps	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/RJ45/SFP	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+		
	10 Gbps							
	25Gbps							
Virtual Appliance						up to 10 cards at up to 10G each		
Supported Network Topologies								
Point-to-Point (P2P)	Point-to-Point (P2P)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies								
Port-based	Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VLAN-based								
Supported Networks (Encryption)	Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVP-Line)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)								
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)	Ethernet MPLS (MPLSvE)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IPv4/IPv6							
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)								
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)	Ethernet (native)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	MPLS (EoMPLS)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios								
Supported Usage Scenarios	TCP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	UDP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios								
Supported Usage Scenarios	Single tenant	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Multi-tenant	*	*	*	*	✓/one tenant per port	*	✓
Self-managed								
Self-managed	Managed encryption service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform								
Platform used	Mainboard/Firmware	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/IDQuantique	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas
	Key Management	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas

\* IP support only in combination with TRANSEC and limited to P2P. Additional overhead and latency.  
\* Multi-tenancy support based on certificates. Requires common trust domain of multiple CAs or use of a single CA



Idquantique

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher
	Preferred Mode of Operation Alternative Mode of Operation Key Length (in bit)
Processing Method	cutthrough store&forward
Encryption Hardware	FPGA
	ASIC
	CPU
Latency	
Latency P2P Mode	cutthrough store & forward
Latency MP Mode	cutthrough store & forward

Encryption Modes
Native Ethernet Encryption
Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)
Ethernet multi-hop support
Transport (Payload only)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC Addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Definable encryption offset (frames)
Variable encryption offset
Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content
Ethertype mutation
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support
Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC Addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support

AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES GCM CFB/CTR 128/256	AES CTR GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 128/256	AES CTR GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 128/256
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<10µs (@1Gbps) * <10µs (@1Gbps) *	<10µs (@1Gbps) * <10µs (@1Gbps) *	<10µs * <10µs *	<5µs * <5µs *	<5µs * <5µs *	<2µs * <2µs *	<2µs * <2µs *

Encryption Modes

Native Ethernet Encryption

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017
GCM 18 256 frames	GCM 16 256 frames	GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017
8 (CTR) + tunnel (min. 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (min. 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (min. 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (min. 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (min. 18 bytes) ✓	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min 18 bytes) 24 + tunnel (min. 18 bytes) ✓		

512 4000unlimited 256 GCM 16 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	512 4000unlimited 256 GCM 16 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	512 4000unlimited 256 GCM 16 ✓ 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	512 4000unlimited 512 GCM 16 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	512 4000unlimited 512 GCM 16 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 0 (CFB)/8 (CTR) 24 ✓	512 4000unlimited 512 GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 16 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 8 (CTR) 24 ✓	512 4000unlimited 512 GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017) 16 256 frames ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 8 (CTR) 24 ✓
---	---	--	---	---	---	---

\*imitation only in MAC mode

\*GCM (Roadmap Q4 2017)

\* except for CN3100/CN120 store & forward only in combination with TRANSEC and limited to P2P. Frame mode, tunnel mode and LoP only when using TRANSEC. Frame mode not native. Additional overhead and latency.

Idquantique

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC Addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support

Native IP Encryption

Supported IP versions
IPv4
IPv6
Supported transmission protocols
TCP
UDP
Transport/Tunnel Mode
Maximum number of peers
Maximum number of IP addresses
Maximum number of multicast groups
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Additional Authenticated Data (header)
Replay Protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

Selective Encryption

Based on MAC Address
Based on VLAN ID
Based on Ethernetp
Based on Multicast Group
Based on Presence of MPLS Tag
Based on IP Address
Combination of multiple selection criteria

Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on VLAN ID
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP

Traffic Masking

Traffic Flow Security

UDP/TCP	UDP/TCP	UDP/TCP	UDP/TCP	* Roadmap Q4 2017	* Roadmap Q4 2017
2	2	2	2	2	
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	
16	16	16	16	16	
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	
5	5	5	5	5	
8 (CTR) + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	8 (CTR) + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	
24 + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	24 + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	24 + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	24 + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	24 + tunnel (min. 38 bytes)	
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

--	--	--	--	--	--

--	--	--	--	--	--

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

--	--	--	--	--	--

--	--	--	--	--	--

✓	✓	✓	✓	Roadmap Q4 2017	Roadmap Q4 2017
---	---	---	---	-----------------	-----------------

\* EoIP only when using TRANSEC, limited to P2P. Additional overhead and latency.

## Auto-discovery

- Auto-discovery of network encryptors
- Auto-discovery of key servers
- Auto-discovery of VLANs
- Disabling of auto-discovery

## Key Server

- Integrated Key Server
- Support for external Key Server
- External Key Server
- Support for multiple distributed key Servers
- Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
- Autonomous operation

## Key Management

Key Generation and Storage
Hardware Random Number Generation
Tamper-Resistant Key Storage (tamper-evident or tamper-proof)
Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)
RSA
Key length
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Key length
Supported Curves:
NIST
Brainpool
Custom Curves

## Hash Algorithms

SHA-2	Key length
-------	------------

## Device Authentication

**Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)**

- Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor
- Key length

**Asymmetric Signature: Certificate**

Protocol	Maximum number of certificates per encryption key length	Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual signature key protocol)
...	...	...

## Key Agreement and Key Exchange

Master Key (KEK) Agreement	Master Key (KEK) Exchange Protocol	Automatic Change of Master Key	Minimum suggested Time Interval for Master Key Change (min)
Separate Master Key (KEK) per site	Separate Master Key (KEK) per group	Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement	Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol
		Automatic Change of Session Keys	Automatic Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)

## Idquantique

A vertical bar chart consisting of six segments. The segments alternate in color: light blue, light purple, light blue, light purple, light blue, and light purple from top to bottom. Each segment contains four small black arrows pointing to the right, arranged in a horizontal row.

A vertical strip of eight grayscale images showing a bird in flight. The images are arranged in a column, with alternating light and dark background segments. The bird is captured in various stages of its wing cycle, with its wings spread wide in most frames. The background is a uniform light gray in the first, third, fifth, seventh, and eighth frames, and a uniform dark gray in the second, fourth, and sixth frames. The bird's silhouette is clearly visible against both backgrounds.

✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ TE/TP	✓ORNG TE/TP	✓ORNG TE/TP	✓ORNG TE/TP

Year	2048	2048	2048	2048	2048	2048
2048						
512						
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

512	512	512	512	512	512
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

[illegible]

ECDH/RS Serials	ECDH/RS Serials	ECDH/RS Serials	ECDH/RS Serials	ECDH/RS Serials	ECDH/RS Serials
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1440	1440	1440	1440	1440	1440
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A
1	1	1	1	1	1

Idquantique

Key System

Point-to-Point Key System

Supported key system

Pairwise  
Group

Key assignment based on:

MAC address  
VLAN ID  
Port  
Group  
IP Address

Point-to-Multipoint Key System

Supported key systems:

Pairwise  
Group

Key assignment based on:

MAC address  
VLAN ID  
Port  
Group  
IP Address

Multipoint Key System

Supported key systems:

Pairwise  
Group  
Mixed (pairwise unicast, group multicast)

Key assignment based on:

MAC address (pairwise and mixed)  
Multicast groups (mixed)  
VLAN ID (group)  
Port  
Group (group)  
IP Address  
IP Multicast Group

Individual key per multicast group  
Individual key per broadcast group (VLAN ID)

Group Key System Specifics

Additional separate authentication per group

Group Membership Definition

Multicast group membership  
Individual membership  
Network membership  
VLAN membership  
Trunked VLAN membership  
IP Address

Exclusion

MAC address  
VLAN ID  
Frames with MPLS tag  
IP Address  
IP Multicast Group

Group Key Distribution

Unicast (unique KEK per group member)  
Broadcast (same KEK for all group members)

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group	Bidirectional Group
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

## Idquantique

## Network Support

- Jump in the Wire deployment
- JUnit Frame Support
- Ethereal Flow Control via PAUSE
- Ethereal Fragmentation/Defragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multipoint
  - Multipoint
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Phase-through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

- IPv4
- IPv6
- Out-of-band Management
  - RS-232C/24
  - Separate Ethernet port
- Smart Card (Secure Card Support)
- USB Port
- In-band Management
  - SSH
  - SNMP (read-only/read-write)
  - TL3
  - Proprietary
- Remote Monitoring (SNMP)

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- Syslog Support (Server)

## Unit

Height is 19" Rack	Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports
Physical Device Access	
Redundant Power Supply	
Redundant, hot-swappable power supply	
High Availability (functionally two-node cluster)	
MBF	
Tamper Security	
Security Approvals	
Safety Approvals	
Boot Time	
Cold boot until operational (P/P)	
Warm boot until operational (P/P)	

Age Group	Percentage
18-24	18%
25-34	22%
35-44	25%
45-54	28%
55+	30%

Response	Percentage
Yes	65%
No	25%
Don't know	10%

Model	RO/RW	RO/RW	RO/RW	RO/RW	RO/RW
V1N2ch3	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RO/RW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
V1N2ch3	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RO/RW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
V1N2ch3	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RO/RW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
V1N2ch3	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RO/RW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Frequency	Count
Every day	10
Several times a week	8
Once a week	7
Several times a month	5
Once a month	4
Less than once a month	3
Never	2

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Test Case	Test Case	Test Case	Test Case	Test Case	Test Case
Desktop 1 back	Desktop 1 back	1U 1 front	1U 1 front	4U 1-10 front	1U 1 front
Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h T/TP	Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h T/TP	Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h T/TP	Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h T/TP	Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h T/TP	Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h T/TP
FP-S1402.13, CC-EAL2, UC-APL, NATO EN50522 class B, EN61000, RHOHS	FP-S1402.13, CC-EAL2, UC-APL, NATO EN50522 class B, EN61000, RHOHS	FP-S1402.13, CC-EAL2, UC-APL, NATO EN50522 class B, EN61000, RHOHS	FP-S1402.13, CC-EAL2, UC-APL, NATO EN50522 class B, EN61000, RHOHS	FP-S1402.13, CC-EAL2, in progress EN50522 class B, EN61000, RHOHS	*
65s 80s	65s 80s	65s 80s	65s 80s	65s 80s	65s 80s

\* For CN 9100 CC EAL2+ in progress, for CN 9120, FIPS 140-2 L3 and CC EAL2+ planned. For both: UC APL and NATO planned

## Management Software

Price

\* Additionally available: Premium support (24x7 support, Advance RMA) with Plus Maintenance

Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity				
Line Interface/Supported Line Rates				
10 Mbs 100 Mbps 1 Gbps 10 Gbps 25Gbps 40 Gbps 100 Gbps Virtual Appliance	✓/RL4S	✓/kRL4S4KSF+	✓/kRL4S4KSF+	✓/kRL4S4KSF+
	✓/RL4S	✓/kRL4S4KSF	✓/kRL4S4KSF+	✓/kRL4S4KSF+
		✓/kRL4S4KSF	✓/kRL4S4KSF+	✓/kRL4S4KSF+
		✓/license upgrade		
				✓/OSFP
on request				
Supported Network Topologies				
Point-to-Point (P2P) Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) Multipoint (MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies				
<b>Port-based</b> Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line) Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree) Ethernet Private LAN (EP-LAN)	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>VLAN-based</b> Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVP-Line) Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree) Ethernet Virtual Private LAN (EVP-LAN)	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)				
Ethernet MPLS IP-v4/IP-6	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)				
Ethernet (native) MPLS (EGMP,LS) IP-v4/IP-6	✓	✓	✓	✓
TCP UDP				
supported by SITline IP Roadmap Q3 2017				
supported by SITline IP Roadmap Q3 2017				
supported by SITline IP Roadmap Q3 2017				
Supported Usage Scenarios				
Single tenant Multi-tenant	✓	✓	✓	✓
Self-managed Managed encryption service Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓
separate network and security management (NMS, SMS)				
Platform				
<b>Platform used</b> Mainboard/Firmware Key Management				
Rohde & Schwarz Rohde & Schwarz	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher Preferred Mode of Operation Alternative Mode of Operation Key Length (in bit)
Processing Method	cutthrough store&forward
Encryption Hardware	FPGA ASIC CPU
Latency	
Latency P2P Mode	cutthrough store & forward
Latency MP Mode	cutthrough store & forward

Encryption Modes

Native Ethernet Encryption

Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	Integrity protection (algorithm) Authentication length (bytes) Reply protection Variable replay window (size) Counter length (in bytes) Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption) Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)
------------------------------------	---

Transport (Payload only)	Max. number of peers Max. number of MAC Addresses Max. number of VLAN IDs Integrity protection (algorithm) Authentication length (bytes) Reply protection Variable replay window (size) Variable encryption offset (fixed) Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content EtherType mutation (unauthenticated encryption only) Counter length (in bytes) Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE) Ethernet multi-hop support
--------------------------	--

Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	Max. number of peers Max. number of MAC Addresses Max. number of VLAN IDs Integrity protection (algorithm) Authentication length (bytes) Reply protection Variable replay window (size) Counter length (in bytes) Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE) Ethernet multi-hop support
---------------------------------	---

AES GCM CFB 256	AES GCM CFB 256	AES GCM CFB 256	AES GCM CFB 256
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---

✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---

N/A * N/A *	5µs * 5µs *	<3µs * <3µs *	<3µs * <3µs *
----------------------	----------------------	------------------------	------------------------

\* dependent on packet size/bandwidth

✓ GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 0 (CFB), 5 (CTR) 13-21	✓ GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 0 (CFB), 5 (CTR) 13-21	✓ GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 0 (CFB), 5 (CTR) 13-21	✓ GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 0 (CFB), 5 (CTR) 13-21
--	--	--	--

✓ unlimited 250 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority	✓ unlimited 4000 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority	✓ unlimited 4000 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority	✓ unlimited 4000 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority
5 (PP), 10 (MP) 13-21 (PP), 18-26 (MP)	5 (PP), 10 (MP) 13-21 (PP), 18-26 (MP)	5 (PP), 10 (MP) 13-21 (PP), 18-26 (MP)	5 (PP), 10 (MP) 13-21 (PP), 18-26 (MP)

✓ unlimited 230 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 18-26 (P2P), 28-36 (MP)	✓ unlimited 4000 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 18-26 (P2P), 28-36 (MP)	✓ unlimited 4000 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 18-26 P2P 28-36 (MP)	✓ unlimited 4000 GCM 8-16 3 frames per priority 18-26 (P2P), 28-36 (MP)
--	---	--	---

tunnel in multipoint mode only replaces destination address



Ethernet over IP (EoIP)	
Tunnel (Ethernet over IP) Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP) Max. number of peers Max. number of MAC Addresses Max. number of VLAN IDs Integrity protection (algorithm) Authentication length (bytes) Replay protection Variable replay window (size) Counter length (in bytes) Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE) Ethernet multi-hop support	
Native IP Encryption	
Supported IP versions IPv4 IPv6	supported by SITime IP Roadmap Q3 2017 supported by SITime IP Roadmap Q3 2017
Supported transmission protocols TCP UDP	supported by SITime IP Roadmap Q3 2017 supported by SITime IP Roadmap Q3 2017
Transport/Tunnel Mode Maximum number of peers Maximum number of IP addresses Maximum number of multicast groups Integrity protection (algorithm) Authentication length (bytes) Additional Authenticated Data (header) Replay Protection Variable replay window (size) Counter length (in bytes) Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	supported by SITime IP Roadmap Q3 2017
Selective Encryption	
Based on MAC Address Based on VLAN ID Based on EtherType Based on Multicast Group Based on Presence of MPLS T tag Based on IP Address Combination of multiple selection criteria	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mixed Ethernet MPLS, EoIP and IP Support	
Based on VLAN ID MPLS EoIP IP	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Based on presence of MPLS tag MPLS EoIP IP	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag MPLS EoIP IP	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Traffic Masking	
Traffic Flow Security	

Auto-discovery

- Auto-discovery of network encryptors
- Auto-discovery of key servers
- Auto-discovery of VLANs
- Disabling of auto-discovery

Key Server

- Integrated Key Server
- Support for external Key Server
- External Key Server
- Support for multiple distributed Key Servers
- Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
- Autonomous operation

Key Management

- Key Generation and Storage
  - Hardware Random Number Generation
  - Tamper Security Key Storage (tamper-evident or tamper-proof)

Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)

- RSA
  - Key length
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
  - Key length
- Supported Curves:
  - NIST
  - Brainpool
  - Custom Curves

Hash Algorithms

- SHA-2
  - Key length

Device Authentication

- Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)
  - Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor
  - Key length
- Asymmetric Signature: Certificate
  - Maximum number of certificates per encryptor
  - Key length
- Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual)
- Signature key protocol

Key Agreement and Key Exchange

- Master Key (KEK) Agreement
- Master Key (KEK) Exchange Protocol
- Automatic Change of Master Key
- Minimum suggested Time Interval for Master Key Change (min)
- Separate Master Key (KEK) per site
- Separate Master Key (KEK) per group
- Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement
- Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol
- Automatic Change of Session Keys
- Minimum Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)

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- ✓
- ✓
- ✓
- ✓

Automatische Partnerschaften über VLANs

Key Server

- ✓
- ✓
- ✓
- ✓
- N/A
- ✓

Key Management

- ✓ (PTG-3)  
TE/TP
- ✓ (PTG-3)  
TE/TP
- ✓ (PTG-3)  
TE/TP
- ✓ (PTG-3)  
TE/TP

- 2048
- 257
- 2048
- 257
- 2048
- 257
- 2048
- 257

- 256
- 256
- 256
- 256

- x.509
  - 1
  - 257
- x.509
  - 1
  - 257
- x.509
  - 1
  - 257
- x.509
  - 1
  - 257
- ECDSA
- ECDSA
- ECDSA
- ECDSA

- DHECKAS
  - ECDH
  - ✓
  - 360
- ✓
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1
- DHECKAS
  - ECDH
  - ✓
  - 360
- ✓
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1
- DHECKAS
  - ECDH
  - ✓
  - 360
- ✓
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1
- Rohde & Schwarz  
Rohde & Schwarz
  - ✓
  - 1

## Key System

## Supported key system

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36
37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44
45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52
53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64
65	66	67	68
69	70	71	72
73	74	75	76
77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84
85	86	87	88
89	90	91	92
93	94	95	96
97	98	99	100

MAC Address  
VLAN ID

Supported key systems:

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	32
33	34	35	36
37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44
45	46	47	48
49	50	51	52
53	54	55	56
57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64
65	66	67	68
69	70	71	72
73	74	75	76
77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84
85	86	87	88
89	90	91	92
93	94	95	96
97	98	99	100

MAC Address  
VLAN ID

Supported key systems:

Unidirectional Group	Unidirectional Group	Unidirectional Group	Unidirectional Group
✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓

MAC address (pairwise and mixed)  
Multicast groups (mixed)

Individual key per broadcast group (VLAN ID)

Additional separate authentication per group

Frequency	Count (approx.)
Never	15
Sometimes	10
Often	25
Very often	18

Network membership  
VLAN membership

MAC address	VLAN ID
000000000000	1
000000000000	2
000000000000	3
000000000000	4
000000000000	5
000000000000	6
000000000000	7
000000000000	8
000000000000	9
000000000000	10
000000000000	11
000000000000	12
000000000000	13
000000000000	14
000000000000	15
000000000000	16
000000000000	17
000000000000	18
000000000000	19
000000000000	20
000000000000	21
000000000000	22
000000000000	23
000000000000	24
000000000000	25
000000000000	26
000000000000	27
000000000000	28
000000000000	29
000000000000	30
000000000000	31
000000000000	32
000000000000	33
000000000000	34
000000000000	35
000000000000	36
000000000000	37
000000000000	38
000000000000	39
000000000000	40
000000000000	41
000000000000	42
000000000000	43
000000000000	44
000000000000	45
000000000000	46
000000000000	47
000000000000	48
000000000000	49
000000000000	50
000000000000	51
000000000000	52
000000000000	53
000000000000	54
000000000000	55
000000000000	56
000000000000	57
000000000000	58
000000000000	59
000000000000	60
000000000000	61
000000000000	62
000000000000	63
000000000000	64
000000000000	65
000000000000	66
000000000000	67
000000000000	68
000000000000	69
000000000000	70
000000000000	71
000000000000	72
000000000000	73
000000000000	74
000000000000	75
000000000000	76
000000000000	77
000000000000	78
000000000000	79
000000000000	80
000000000000	81
000000000000	82
000000000000	83
000000000000	84
000000000000	85
000000000000	86
000000000000	87
000000000000	88
000000000000	89
000000000000	90
000000000000	91
000000000000	92
000000000000	93
000000000000	94
000000000000	95
000000000000	96
000000000000	97
000000000000	98
000000000000	99



Unicast (unique KEK per group member)  
Broadcast (same KEK for all group members)

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Network Support										
Bump in the Wire deployment Jumbo Frame Support Ethernet Flow Control via PAUSE  Ethernet Fragmentation/Degradation Point-to-Point Point-to-Multipoint Multipoint  Dead Peer Detection Optical Loss Pass-Through Link Loss Carry Forward	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		
System Configuration and Management Access										
IPv4 IPv6  Out-of-band Management RS-232/V.24 Separate Ethernet port Smart Card (Secure Card) Support USB Port  In-band Management SSH SNMP (read-only/read-write) TLS Proprietary  Remote Monitoring (SNMP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Logs										
Event Log (local) Audit Log (local) Syslog Support (Server)	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		
Unit										
Height in 19" Rack Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports Physical Device Access Redundant Power Supply Redundant, hot-swappable power supply High Availability functionality (two-node cluster) MTBF Tamper Security  Security Approvals Safety Approvals  Boot Time	1U (1/2, 19" width) 1 ✓ ✓ 1-1 350000h TE/TP	1 1 or 4 front ✓ ✓ 1-1 170000h TE/TP	1 1 or 4 front ✓ ✓ 1-1 170000h TE/TP	1 1 or 4 front ✓ ✓ 1-1 170000h TE/TP	1 1 or 4 front ✓ ✓ 1-1 170000h TE/TP					
	BSI VS-NID, EU restraint CE, ROHS					BSI VS-NID, EU restraint CE, ROHS				
	BSI VS-NID, EU restraint CE, ROHS					BSI VS-NID, EU restraint, **CC EAL4+ CE, ROHS				
	BSI VS-NID, EU restraint CE, ROHS					BSI VS-NID, EU restraint, **CC EAL4+ CE, ROHS				
	BSI VS-NID, EU restraint CE, ROHS					BSI VS-NID, EU restraint, **CC EAL4+ CE, ROHS				

Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity

Management Software

User Interface	Native PC application Embedded Webapp CLI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Initial Device Set-up	Local (out-of-band) Remote (out-of-band)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Device Configuration	Local (out-of-band) Remote (in-band) Remote (out-of-band)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Management Access	Role-based access Identity-based authentication of user Number of hierarchy levels Number of roles Strict internal separation of users	✓ 2 8 ✓	✓ 2 8 ✓	✓ 2 8 ✓	✓ 2 8 ✓	✓ 2 8 ✓
Device Management	Device Diagnostics Link Monitoring (SNMP) Connection Diagnostics In-band Network Diagnostics Remote Update/Upgrade	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Certificate Authority & Management	Certificate Creation Certificate Management	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓
Key Management	Group creation Group isolation Key assignment Fail-over configuration	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

via key management

Price

List Price Encryption Unit (in €) Per external Key Server (in €)	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
Required Management Software	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
2-10 encryptions	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
11-25 encryptions	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
26-50 encryptions	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
51+ encryptions	on request	on request	on request	on request	on request
Warranty Period (months)	12	12	12	12	12
Warranty Coverage	✓ 3% 3% 5%	✓ 3% 3% 5%	✓ 3% 3% 5%	✓ 3% 3% 5%	✓ 3% 3% 5%
Warranty Extension (per year)					

SecuNet						
Line Interface/Supported Line Rates						
10 Mbps 100 Mbps 1 Gbps 10 Gbps 25Gbps 40 Gbps 100 Gbps  Virtual Appliance	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	Roadmap Q2 2017		Roadmap Q4 2017
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP	✓/QSFP28
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP	✓/QSFP28
			✓/SFP		✓/QSFP	✓/QSFP28
						✓/QSFP28
Supported Network Topologies						
Point-to-Point (P2P) Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) Multipoint (MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies						
Port-based  Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line) Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree) Ethernet Private LAN (EP-LAN)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VLAN-based  Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVP-Line) Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree) Ethernet Virtual Private LAN (EVP-LAN)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)						
Ethernet MPLS IP v4/v6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)						
Ethernet (native) MPLS (ECMP/LS) IPv4/IPv6  TCP UDP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios						
Single tenant Multi-tenant  Self-managed Managed encryption service Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform						
Platform used  Mainboard/Firmware Key Management	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia
	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher
	Preferred Mode of Operation
Processing Method	Alternative Mode of Operation
	Key Length (in bit)
Encryption Hardware	cutthrough
	store&forward
Latency	cutthrough
	store & forward
Latency P2P Mode	cutthrough
	store & forward
Latency MP Mode	cutthrough
	store & forward

Encryption Modes

Native Ethernet Encryption

Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)	
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Transport (Payload only)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Definable encryption offset (fixed)
	Variable encryption offset
	Adaptive encryption offset Based on frame content
	Ethertype mutation (unauthenticated encryption only)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Secunet

AES	AES	AES	AES	AES
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
256	256	256	256	256
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<42/s	<42/s	<8/s	<4/s	<4/s
<48/s	<48/s	<8/s	<4/s	<2/s
<42/s	<42/s	<8/s	<4/s	<2/s
<48/s	<48/s	<9/s	<4/s	<2/s

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
256	256	unlimited	256	256
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
32	32	32	32	32
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

\*IMX=100%

Secured

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)	
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)	
Max. number of peers	2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)
Max. number of MAC Addresses	unlimited
Max. number of VLAN IDs	unlimited
Integrity protection (algorithm)	GCM
Authentication length (bytes)	8/16
Replay protection	✓
Variable replay window (size)	0-30s
Registered Etypeype	8
Counter length (in bytes)	8
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption	N/A
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	54/62*
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Native IP Encryption

Supported IP versions	
IPv4	
IPv6	
Supported transmission protocols	
TCP	
UDP	
Transport Tunnel Mode	
Maximum number of peers	
Maximum number of IP addresses	
Maximum number of multicast groups	
Integrity protection (algorithm)	
Authentication length (bytes)	
Additional Authenticated Data (header)	
Replay Protection	
Variable replay window (size)	
Counter length (in bytes)	
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)	

Selective Encryption

Based on MAC Address
Based on VLAN ID
Based on EtherType
Based on Multicast Group
Based on Presence of MPLS T tag
Based on IP Address
Combination of multiple selection criteria

Mixed Ethernet MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on VLAN ID	
MPLS	✓
EoIP	✓
IP	✓
Based on presence of MPLS tag	
MPLS	✓
EoIP	✓
IP	✓
Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag	
MPLS	✓
EoIP	✓
IP	✓

Traffic Masking

Traffic Flow Security
-----------------------

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)	native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP)
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
54/62*	54/62*	54/62*	54/62*	54/62*
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

\*MIX=100%

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8
IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

\*\*TFS mode only, secure based on ASIC or FPGA



Auto-discovery

- Auto-discovery of network endpoints
- Auto-discovery of key servers
- Auto-discovery of VLANs
- Deadblow of auto-discovery

Key Server

- Integrated Key Server
- Support for external Key Server
- External Key Server
- Support for multiple distributed Key Servers
- Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
- Autonomous operation

Key Management

Key Generation and Storage

- Hardware Random Number Generation
- Trusted Security Key Storage (tamper-evident or tamper-proof)

Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)

- RSA
  - Key length
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
  - Key length
- Supported Curves:
  - NIST
  - Brainpool
  - Custom Curves

Hash Algorithms

- SHA-2
  - Key length
- CBC-MAC-GCM
  - Key length

Device Authentication

- Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)
  - Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor
  - Key length

- Asymmetric Signature: Certificate
  - Maximum number of certificates per encryptor
  - Key length

- Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual)
- Signature key protocol

Key Agreement and Key Exchange

- Master Key (KEK) Agreement
- Master Key (KEK) Exchange Protocol
- Automatic Change of Master Key
- Minimum suggested time interval for Master Key Change (min)
- Separate Master Key (KEK) per site
- Separate Master Key (KEK) per group
- Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement
- Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol
- Automatic Change of Session Keys
- Minimum Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)

Secured

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP	TE/TP
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
512/521	512/521	512/521	512/521	512/521	512/521
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

512	512	512	512	512	512
256	256	256	256	256	256

512 (recommended:18) 256	512 (recommended:18) 256	512 (recommended:18) 256	512 (recommended:18) 256	512 (recommended:18) 256	512 (recommended:18) 256
optional 64 (recommended:18) 512	optional 64 (recommended:18) 512	optional 64 (recommended:18) 512	optional 64 (recommended:18) 512	optional 64 (recommended:18) 512	optional 64 (recommended:18) 512
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
AES/MAC/ECDSA***	AES/MAC/ECDSA***	AES/MAC/ECDSA***	AES/MAC/ECDSA***	AES/MAC/ECDSA***	AES/MAC/ECDSA***

ECKAS-DH**** ✓ atmedia 60 ✓	ECKAS-DH**** ✓ atmedia 60 ✓	ECKAS-DH**** ✓ atmedia 60 ✓	ECKAS-DH**** ✓ atmedia 60 ✓	ECKAS-DH**** ✓ atmedia 60 ✓	ECKAS-DH**** ✓ atmedia 60 ✓
atmedia atmedia 1	atmedia atmedia 1	atmedia atmedia 1	atmedia atmedia 1	atmedia atmedia 1	atmedia atmedia 1

\*\*\*ECDSA optional for use with optional certificates  
\*\*\*\*NIST, Brainpool or custom curves with 256 to 521 bit length

## Key System

### Point-to-Point Key System

Supported key system

Pairwise  
Group

**Key assignment based on:**

MAC Address  
VLAN ID  
Port  
Group  
IP Address

### Point-to-Multipoint Key System

Supported key systems:

Pairwise  
Group

**Key assignment based on:**

MAC Address  
VLAN ID  
Port  
Group  
IP Address

## Multipoint Key System

Supported key systems:

Pairwise  
Group  
Mixed (pairwise unicast, group multicast)

**Key assignment based on:**

- MAC address (pairwise and mixed)
- Multicast groups (mixed)
- VLAN ID (group)
- Port
- Group (group)
- IP Address
- IP Multicast Group

Individual key per multicast group  
Individual key per broadcast group (VLAN ID)

### Group Key System Specifics

Additional separate authentication per group

### Group Membership Definition

- Multicast group membership
- Individual membership
- Network membership
- VLAN membership
- Trunked VLAN membership
- IP Address

### Exclusion

MAC address  
VLAN ID  
Frames with MPLS tag  
IP Address  
IP Multicast Group

### Group Key Distribution

Unicast (unique KEK per group member)  
Broadcast (same KEK for all group members)

**Secunet**

[illegible]

## Network Support

- Bump in the Wire deployment
- Jumbo Frame Support
- Ethernet Flow Control via PAUSE
- Ethernet Fragmentation/Defragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multipoint
  - Multipoint
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Pass-Through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

IPv4	Out-of-band Management	RS-232N/24	SSH
IPv6	Smart Card (Secure Card)	Separate Ethernet port	SNMP (read-only/read-write)
	USB Port		TLS
	In-band Management		Proprietary
			Remote Monitoring (SNMP)

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- Syslog Support (Server)

## Unit

Height in 19" Rack	
Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports	
Physical Device Access	
Redundant Power Supply	
Redundant, hot-swappable power supply	
High Availability functionality (two-node cluster)	
MTBF	
Tamper Security	
Security Approvals	
Safety Approvals	
Boot Time	
Cold boot until operational	
Warm boot until operational	

**Secunet**

Category	Sub-category	Value
N/A	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
N/A	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
N/A	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
N/A	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓
	✓	✓

## System Configuration and Management Access

Figure 1 consists of eight bar charts arranged in a 2x4 grid. The top row shows data for 'Total' respondents, and the bottom row shows data for 'U.S. born' respondents. The columns represent different groups: 'Total', 'U.S. born', 'Foreign born', and 'U.S. born'. Each chart has a y-axis labeled 'Percentage' from 0 to 100. The x-axis lists four categories: 'Total', 'U.S. born', 'Foreign born', and 'U.S. born'. The bars are colored light blue for 'Total' and light gray for 'U.S. born'. The data is as follows:

Group	Category	Percentage
Total	Total	~45%
	U.S. born	~45%
	Foreign born	~45%
	U.S. born	~45%
U.S. born	Total	~45%
	U.S. born	~45%
	Foreign born	~45%
	U.S. born	~45%

Access	Access	Access	Access	Access
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
read-only	read-only	read-only	read-only	read-only
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3

## Logs

## Unit

[illegible]

BSI VS-ND, NATO restricted, EU Restrict (including 2nd Evaluation by NL)	*****	*****
EN50502 Class B, FCC Part 15 Class B, RCHS		

25s	25s	25s	25s	25s
27s	27s	27s	27s	27s

\*\*\*\*\*BSI VS-NfD, NATO restricted and EU Restrint planned/in preparation

**Secunet**

## Management Software

[illegible]

on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request	on request on request
included included included	included included included	included included included	included included included	included included included	included included included
36	36	36	36	36	36
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Securosys

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates						
10 Mbps 100 Mbps 1 Gbps 10 Gbps 25Gbps 40 Gbps 100 Gbps  Virtual Appliance	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP28
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP28
				✓/SFP		✓/QSFP28
						✓/QSFP28
Supported Network Topologies						
Point-to-Point (P2P) Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) Multipoint (MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies						
Port-based	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VLAN-based	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)						
Ethernet	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)						
Ethernet (native) MPLS (ECMP/LS) IPv4/IPv6  TCP UDP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios						
Single tenant Multi-tenant  Self-managed Managed encryption service Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform						
Platform used  Mainboard/Firmware Key Management	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia
	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher
	Preferred Mode of Operation
Processing Method	Alternative Mode of Operation
	Key Length (in bit)
cutthrough	
store&forward	
Encryption Hardware	
FPGA	
ASIC	
CPU	
Latency	
Latency P2P Mode	cutthrough
Latency MP Mode	store & forward
Latency MIP Mode	cutthrough
	store & forward

Encryption Modes

Native Ethernet Encryption

Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)	
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Transport (Payload only)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Definable encryption offset (fixed)
	Variable encryption offset
	Adaptive encryption offset Based on frame content
	Ethertype mutation (unauthenticated encryption only)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Replay protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support	

Securosys

AES GCM 256	AES GCM 256	AES GCM 256	AES GCM 256	AES GCM 256	AES GCM 256
<42/μs <18/μs <42/μs <18/μs	<8/μs <9/μs <8/μs <9/μs	<42/μs <18/μs <42/μs <18/μs	<8/μs <9/μs <8/μs <9/μs	<4/μs <4/μs <4/μs <4/μs	<2/μs <2/μs <2/μs <2/μs
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓ GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 18/26 N/A	✓ GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 18/26 N/A	✓ GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 18/26 N/A	✓ GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 18/26 N/A	✓ GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 18/26 N/A	✓ GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 18/26 N/A
--	--	--	--	--	--

✓ 1000 unlimited 256 GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s ✓ ✓ ✓ 8 N/A 18/26 ✓	✓ 1000 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s ✓ ✓ ✓ 8 N/A 18/26 ✓	✓ 1000 unlimited 256 GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s ✓ ✓ ✓ 8 N/A 18/26 ✓	✓ 1000 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s ✓ ✓ ✓ 8 N/A 18/26 ✓	✓ 1000 unlimited 256 GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s ✓ ✓ ✓ 8 N/A 18/26 ✓	✓ 1000 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s ✓ ✓ ✓ 8 N/A 18/26 ✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

✓ 32 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 30/38* ✓	✓ 32 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 30/38* ✓	✓ 32 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 30/38* ✓	✓ 32 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 30/38* ✓	✓ 32 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 30/38* ✓	✓ 32 unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 30/38* ✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

\*IMX=100%

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC Addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
AAD (additional authenticated data)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Registered EtherType
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multi-hop support

Native IP Encryption

Supported IP versions
IPv4
IPv6
Supported transmission protocols
TCP
UDP

Transport Tunnel Mode
Maximum number of peers
Maximum number of IP addresses
Maximum number of multicast groups
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Additional Authenticated Data (header)
Replay Protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

Selective Encryption

Based on MAC Address
Based on VLAN ID
Based on EtherType
Based on Multicast Group
Based on Presence of MPLS Tag
Based on IP Address
Combination of multiple selection criteria

Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on VLAN ID
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP

Traffic Masking

Traffic Flow Security

Securosys

✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 54/62* ✓	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 54/62* ✓	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 54/62* ✓	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 54/62* ✓	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 54/62* ✓	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8 N/A 54/62* ✓
--	--	--	--	--	--

\*IMIX=100%

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8	unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8	unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8	unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8	unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8	unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ ✓ 0-30s 8
--	--	--	--	--	--

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

\*-TFS mode only secure based on ASIC or FPGA





## Key System

### Point-to-Point Key System

Supported key system

Pairwise  
Group

**Key assignment based on:**

MAC Address  
VLAN ID  
Port  
Group  
IP Address

### Point-to-Multipoint Key System

Supported key systems:

Pairwise  
Group

**Key assignment based on:**

MAC Address  
VLAN ID  
Port  
Group  
IP Address

## Multipoint Key System

Supported key systems:

Pairwise  
Group

Mixed (pairwise unicast, group multicast)

**Key assignment based on:**

MAC address (pairwise and mixed)

Multicast groups (mixed)

VLAN ID (group)

Port

Group (group)

IP Address

IP Multicast Group

Individual key per multicast group

Individual key per broadcast group (VLAN ID)

### Group Key System Specifics

Additional separate authentication per group

### Group Membership Definition

### Multicast group membership

Individual membership

Network membership

VLAN membership

Trunked VLAN member

IP Address

## Exclusion

MAC address  
VLAN ID  
Frames with MPLS tag  
IP Address  
IP Multicast Group

### Group Key Distribution

Unicast (unique KEK per group member)  
Broadcast (same KEK for all group members)

## Securosys

[illegible]

**Securosys**

## Network Support

- Bump in the Wire deployment
- Jumbo Frame Support
- Ethernet Flow Control Via PAUSE
- Ethernet Fragmentation/Defragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multipoint
  - Multipoint
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Pass-Through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

IPV4	Out-of-band Management	RS-232V/24
IPV6	Smart Card (Secure Card) Support	Separate Ethernet port
	USB Port	
	In-band Management	
		SSH
		SNMP (read-only/read-write)
		TLS
		Proprietary
	Remote Monitoring (SNMP)	

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- Syslog Support (Server)

## Unit

Height in 19" Rack	
Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports	
Physical Device Access	
Redundant Power Supply	
Redundant, hot-swappable power supply	
High Availability functionality (two-node cluster)	
MTBF	
Tamper Security	
Security Approvals	
Safety Approvals	
Boot Time	
Cold boot until operational	
Warm boot until operational	

[illegible]

Access	Access	Access	Access	Access	Access
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
read-only	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3	v2c/v3

Frequency	Percentage
Daily	~65%
Weekly	~25%
Monthly	~5%
Never	~5%

[illegible]

	255 27s	255 27s	255 27s	255 27s	255 27s	255 27s
ENS5032 Class B, FCC Part 15 Class B, ROHS						
255 27s						

\*\*\*\*\* Products using the same platform have BSI VS-NID, NATO restricted, EU Restrict (including 2nd Evaluation by NL) approval

## Securosys

[illegible]

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[illegible]

Senetas

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates		CN4010	CN4020	CN6010	CN6100	CN8000	CN9100	CN9120
Line Interface/Supported Line Rates	10 Mbs							
	100 Mbs	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/RJ45/SFP				
	1 Gbps	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/RJ45/SFP	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+		
	10 Gbps				✓/SFP	✓/SFP+		
	25Gbps	✓/RJ45			✓/SFP	✓/SFP+		
Virtual Appliance	40 Gbps							
	100 Gbps							
Supported Network Topologies								
Supported Network Topologies	Point-to-Point (P2P)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies								
Port-based	Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line)							
	Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree)							
VLAN-based	Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVP-Line)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)								
Supported Networks (Encryption)	Ethernet	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
	MPLS (MPLSoE)							
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)	IPv4/IPv6							
	Ethernet (native)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)	MPLS (EoMPLS)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	IPv4/IPv6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios	Single tenant							
	Multi-tenant	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios	Self-managed	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Managed encryption service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform	Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Platform used							
Platform used	Multi-board/Firmware	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/IDQuantique	Senetas/Senetas	Senetas/Senetas
	Key Management	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas	Senetas

\* IP support only in combination with TRANSEC and limited to P2P. Additional overhead and latency.  
\* Multi-tenancy support based on certificates. Requires common trust domain of multiple CAs or use of a single CA

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher
	Preferred Mode of Operation
Processing Method	Key length (in bit)
	counter mode
Encryption Hardware	FECA
	ASFC
	CTU
Latency	cut-through
	store & forward
Latency P2P Mode	cut-through
	store & forward
Latency MP Mode	cut-through
	store & forward

Encryption Modes

Native Ethernet Encryption

Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Residual length (bytes)
	Variable replay window (sec)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
	Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)
	Ethernet link hop support

Transport (Payload only)	Mk: number of peers
	Mk: number of MAC Addresses
	Mk: number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Residual protection
	Variable replay window (sec)
	Dynamic replay window (sec)
	Variable encryption offset
	Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content
	Ethernet emulation
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
	Frame overhead (authenticated encryption (AE))
	Ethernet multi-hop support

Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	Mk: number of peers
	Mk: number of MAC Addresses
	Mk: number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Residual protection
	Variable replay window (sec)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
	Ethernet multi-hop support

Senetas

AES	AES	AES	AES	AES	AES
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM (Readmap Q4 2017)	AES
CTR	CTR	CTR	CTR	CTR	CTR
128/256	128/256	128/256	128/256	128/256	GCM (Readmap Q4 2017)
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

<10µs (8 (Qbps)	<10µs (8 (Qbps)	<10µs	<5µs	<5µs	<2µs
<10µs (8 (Qbps)	<10µs (8 (Qbps)	<10µs	<5µs	<5µs	<2µs
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	✓	✓
16	16	16	16	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	✓	✓
5	5	5	5	✓	✓
8 (CTB) + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	8 (CTB) + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	8 (CTB) + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	8 (CTB) + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	✓	✓
24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4000/unlimited	4000/unlimited	4000/unlimited	4000/unlimited	4000/unlimited	4000/unlimited
512	512	512	512	512	512
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM (Readmap Q4 2017)	GCM (Readmap Q4 2017)
16	16	16	16	16	16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0 (CTB) / 8 (CTB)	0 (CTB) / 8 (CTB)	0 (CTB) / 8 (CTB)	0 (CTB) / 8 (CTB)	0 (CTB) / 8 (CTB)	8 (CTB)
24	24	24	24	24	24
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2	2	2	2	✓	✓
unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	unlimited	✓	✓
GCM	GCM	GCM	GCM	✓	✓
16	16	16	16	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	256 frames	✓	✓
5	5	5	5	✓	✓
8 (CTB)	8 (CTB)	8 (CTB)	8 (CTB)	✓	✓
24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	24 + tunnel (m: 18 bytes)	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓



## Senetas

Downloaded from <https://www.cambridge.org/core>. University of Cambridge, on 02 Jun 2020 at 10:00:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms>. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009052319.007>

Frequency	Count
Every day	10
Several times a week	8
Once a week	7
Several times a month	5
Once a month	4
Less than once a month	3
Never	2

Downloaded from <https://www.cambridge.org/core>. University of Cambridge, on 01 Jun 2018 at 12:00:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms>. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781315326478.007>

Downloaded from <https://www.cambridge.org/core>. University of Cambridge, on 02 Jun 2020 at 10:00:00, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms>. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X20000509>

[illegible]

Response	Percentage
Yes	65%
No	30%
Don't know	5%

512	512	512	512	512	512
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

[illegible]

ECOHISA Series	ECOHISA Series	ECOHISA Series	ECOHISA Series	ECOHISA Series	ECOHISA Series
1440	1440	1440	1440	1440	1440
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A	ATM Forum Security Specifications NIST SP800-56A
1	1	1	1	1	1





## Senetas

## Network Support

- Jumpo is the Wire deployment
- Jumpo Frame Support
- Element Flow Control via PAUSE
- Element Fragmentation/Detragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multiport
  - Multiport
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Pass-Through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

IPV	Out-of-Band Management	RS-232C/24	SSH (read-only/write)
IPv6	Smart Card (Secure Card)	Separate Ethernet port	TLS
	USB Port		Proprietary
	In-Band Management		

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- System Support (Server)

## Unit

Height in 17" back	
Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports	
Physical Drive Access	
Redundant Power Supply	
Redundant hot-swappable power supply	
High availability (non-hot-swappable) USB	
Temper Security	
Security Approvals	
Safety Approvals	
Boot time	
Cool boot until operational (P2P)	
Warm boot until operational (P2P)	

Age Group	Percentage
18-24	10%
25-34	15%
35-44	20%
45-54	25%
55-64	30%
65+	35%

[illegible]

Age Group	Male (%)	Female (%)
18-24	~45	~55
25-34	~40	~60
35-44	~45	~55
45-54	~40	~60
55-64	~45	~55

	Docktop 1	Docktop 4	TU 1	TU 1-10	TU 1	TU 1
back		back	front	front	front	front
Roadmap 2017 > 200,000h TE/P			✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓

[illegible]

\* For CN 9100 CC EAL2+ in progress, for CN 9120, FIPS 140-2 L3 and CC EAL2+ planned. For both: UC APL and NATO planned

CC EAL2+, FIPS 140-2 L3, UC APL/CPA in progress/planned

## Management Software

User Interface	Native PC application Embedded Weapp CLI
Initial Device Set-up	Local (out-of-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Device Configuration	Local (out-of-band) Remote (in-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Management Access	Role-based access Identity-based authentication of user Number of hierarchy levels Number of roles Strict internal separation of users
Device Management	Device Diagnostics Link Monitoring (SNMP) Connection Diagnostics In-band Network Diagnostics Remote Upgrade/Update
Certificate Authority & Management	Certificate Creation Certificate Management
Key Management	Group creation Group isolation Key assignment Fail-over management

## Price

Warranty Extension (per year)	Warranty Coverage	Warranty Period (months)	Optional SMC Software	Required Management Software	List Price Encryption Unit (in €) Per External Key Server (in €); optional, no requirement, starting price
	Basic Support (9 to 5, e-mail, phone)	Parts & Work	1-4 encryptions	5-10 encryptions	
	Software updates and upgrades		11-20 encryptions	unlimited	

## Senetas

[illegible]

11

on request on request CM7 included free	on request on request CM7 included free	on request on request CM7 included free	on request on request CM7 included free	on request on request CM7 included free	on request on request CM7 included free
12	12	12	12	12	12
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%

\* Additionally available: Premium support (24x7 support, Advance RMA) with Plus Maintenance

Thales E-Security

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates						
10 Mbps 100 Mbps 1 Gbps 10 Gbps 25Gbps 40 Gbps 100 Gbps  Virtual Appliance	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP
	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/RJ45	✓/SFP	✓/SFP+	✓/QSFP
Supported Network Topologies						
Point-to-Point (P2P)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Multipoint (MP)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies						
Port-based	Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Ethernet Private LAN (EP-LAN)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VLAN-based						
Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVP-Line)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethernet Virtual Private LAN (EVP-LAN)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)						
Ethernet	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MPLS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IPv4/IPv6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)						
Ethernet (native)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MPLS (ECMP/LS)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IPv4/IPv6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TCP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UDP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Supported Usage Scenarios						
Single tenant	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Multi-tenant	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Self-managed	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Managed encryption service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Managed security service	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Platform						
Platform used	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia/atmedia	atmedia
Key Management	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia	atmedia

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher
	Preferred Mode of Operation
	Alternative Mode of Operation
Processing Method	Key Length (in bit)
	cut-through
	store&forward
Encryption Hardware	FPGA
	ASIC
	CPU
Latency	cut-through
	store & forward
	cut-through
Latency P2P Mode	store & forward
	cut-through
	store & forward
Latency MP Mode	store & forward
	cut-through
	store & forward
Encryption Modes	
Native Ethernet Encryption	
Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Reply protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)
	Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)
	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
Transport (Payload only)	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Reply protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Definable encryption offset (fixed)
	Variable encryption offset
	Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content
	Ethertype mutation (unauthenticated encryption only)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)	Max. number of peers
	Max. number of MAC Addresses
	Max. number of VLAN IDs
	Integrity protection (algorithm)
	Authentication length (bytes)
	Reply protection
	Variable replay window (size)
	Counter length (in bytes)
	Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption
	Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM	AES GCM
256	256	256	256	256	256	256
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<42µs	<3µs	<42µs	<4µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs
<48µs	<3µs	<48µs	<4µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs
<42µs	<3µs	<42µs	<4µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs
<48µs	<3µs	<48µs	<4µs	<4µs	<4µs	<2µs

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16	GCM 8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26

1000 unlimited	1000 unlimited	1000 unlimited	1000 unlimited	1000 unlimited	1000 unlimited	1000 unlimited
256 GCM	256 GCM	256 GCM	256 GCM	256 GCM	256 GCM	256 GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
8	8	8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26	18/26

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
32 unlimited	32 unlimited	32 unlimited	32 unlimited	32 unlimited	32 unlimited	32 unlimited
unlimited GCM	unlimited GCM	unlimited GCM	unlimited GCM	unlimited GCM	unlimited GCM	unlimited GCM
8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16	8/16
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s	0-30s
8	8	8	8	8	8	8
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*	30/38*
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

\*IMIX=100%

Thales E-Security

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

<b>Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)</b>
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)
Max. number of peers
Max. number of MAC addresses
Max. number of VLAN IDs
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Replay protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)
Ethernet multihop support

✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 54/62*	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 54/62*	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 54/62*	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 54/62*	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 54/62*	✓ native IP/UDP 2 (P2P), 1000 (MP) unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 54/62*
--	--	--	--	--	--

\*IMIX=100%

Native IP Encryption

<b>Supported IP versions</b>
IPv4
IPv6
<b>Supported transmission protocols</b>
TCP
UDP

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

<b>Transport Tunnel Mode</b>
Maximum number of peers
Maximum number of IP addresses
Maximum number of multicast groups
Integrity protection (algorithm)
Authentication length (bytes)
Additional Authenticated Data (header)
Replay Protection
Variable replay window (size)
Counter length (in bytes)
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66	unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited GCM 8/16 ✓ 0-30s 8 IPv4: 38/46, IPv6: 58/66
--	--	--	--	--	--

Selective Encryption

Based on MAC Address
Based on VLAN ID
Based on Ethertype
Based on Multicast Group
Based on Presence of MPLS Tag
Based on IP Address
Combination of multiple selection criteria

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
--	--	--	--	--	--

Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on VLAN ID
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP
Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag
MPLS
EoIP
IP

✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Traffic Masking

<b>Traffic Flow Security</b>
------------------------------

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
---	---	---	---	---	---

\*\*TTS mode only secure based on ASIC or FPGA

## Thales E-Security

## Auto-discovery

- Auto-discovery of network encryptions
- Auto-discovery of key servers
- Auto-discovery of VLANs
- Disabling of auto-discovery

## Key Server

- Integrated Key Server
- Support for external Key Server
- External Key Server
- Support for multiple distributed Key Servers
- Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
- Autonomous operation

## Key Management

### Key Generation and Storage

Hardware Random Number Generation  
Tamper Security Key Storage (tamper-evident or tamper-proof)

## Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)

Key length	<b>Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)</b>	Key length
Supported Curves:		
NIST		
Brainpool		
Custom Curves		

## Hash Algorithms

SHA-2	Key length
CBC-MAC-GCM	Key length

### Device Authentication

**Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)**

Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor  
Key length

**Asymmetric Signature: Certificate**

Maximum number of certificates per encryptor  
Key lenght

Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual)  
Signature key protocol

### Key Agreement and Key Exchange

Master Key (KEK) Agreement	Master Key (KEK) Exchange Protocol	Automatic Change of Master Key	Minimum suggested time interval for Master Key Change (min)
Separate Master Key (KEK) per site	Separate Master Key (KEK) per group	Separate Master Key (KEK) per group	Separate Master Key (KEK) per group
Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement	Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol	Automatic Change of Session Key/s	Minimum Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)

## Key Management

### Key Generation and Storage

✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TEMP	TEMP	TEMP	TEMP	TEMP	TEMP

Case	Case	Case	Case	Case	Case
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5/12/521	5/12/521	5/12/521	5/12/521	5/12/521	5/12/521
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

512	512	512	512	512	51
256	256	256	256	256	25

### Device Authentication

[illegible]

### Key Agreement and Key Exchange

ECKAS-DH <sup>4000</sup>	ECKAS-DH <sup>4000</sup>	ECKAS-DH <sup>4000</sup>	ECKAS-DH <sup>4000</sup>	ECKAS-DH <sup>4000</sup>	ECKAS-DH <sup>4000</sup>
atmidea	atmidea	atmidea	atmidea	atmidea	atmidea
60	60	60	60	60	60
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
atmidea	atmidea	atmidea	atmidea	atmidea	atmidea
1	1	1	1	1	1

**\*\*ECDSA optional for use with optional certificates**

\*\*\*\*\*NIST, Brainpool or custom curves with 256 to 521 bit length

\*\*\*\*\*NIST, Brainpool or custom curves with 256 to 521 bit length

## Key System

## Supported key system

Group

**Key assignment based on:**

MAC Address	VLAN ID	Port	Group	IP Address
-------------	---------	------	-------	------------

### Supported key systems

Pairwise  
Group

MAC Address	VLAN ID	Port	Group	IP Address
000000000000	1	1	1	192.168.1.1
000000000000	2	2	2	192.168.2.1
000000000000	3	3	3	192.168.3.1
000000000000	4	4	4	192.168.4.1
000000000000	5	5	5	192.168.5.1
000000000000	6	6	6	192.168.6.1
000000000000	7	7	7	192.168.7.1
000000000000	8	8	8	192.168.8.1
000000000000	9	9	9	192.168.9.1
000000000000	10	10	10	192.168.10.1
000000000000	11	11	11	192.168.11.1
000000000000	12	12	12	192.168.12.1
000000000000	13	13	13	192.168.13.1
000000000000	14	14	14	192.168.14.1
000000000000	15	15	15	192.168.15.1
000000000000	16	16	16	192.168.16.1
000000000000	17	17	17	192.168.17.1
000000000000	18	18	18	192.168.18.1
000000000000	19	19	19	192.168.19.1
000000000000	20	20	20	192.168.20.1
000000000000	21	21	21	192.168.21.1
000000000000	22	22	22	192.168.22.1
000000000000	23	23	23	192.168.23.1
000000000000	24	24	24	192.168.24.1
000000000000	25	25	25	192.168.25.1
000000000000	26	26	26	192.168.26.1
000000000000	27	27	27	192.168.27.1
000000000000	28	28	28	192.168.28.1
000000000000	29	29	29	192.168.29.1
000000000000	30	30	30	192.168.30.1
000000000000	31	31	31	192.168.31.1

### Supported key systems

Pairwise  
Group  
Mixed (pairwise unicast, group multicast)

**Key assignment based on:**

- MAC address (pairwise and mixed)
- Multicast groups (mixed)
- VLAN ID (group)
- Port
  - Group (group)
  - IP Address
  - IP Multicast Group

Individual key per multicast group  
Individual key per broadcast group (VLAN ID)

**Additional separate authentication per group**

### Group Membership Definition

- Multicast group membership
- Individual membership
- Network membership
- VLAN membership
- Trunked VLAN membership
- IP Address

MAC address	VLAN ID
000000000000	1
000000000000	2
000000000000	3
000000000000	4
000000000000	5
000000000000	6
000000000000	7
000000000000	8
000000000000	9
000000000000	10
000000000000	11
000000000000	12
000000000000	13
000000000000	14
000000000000	15
000000000000	16
000000000000	17
000000000000	18
000000000000	19
000000000000	20
000000000000	21
000000000000	22
000000000000	23
000000000000	24
000000000000	25
000000000000	26
000000000000	27
000000000000	28
000000000000	29
000000000000	30
000000000000	31
000000000000	32
000000000000	33
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000000000000	72
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000000000000	80
000000000000	81
000000000000	82
000000000000	83
000000000000	84
000000000000	85
000000000000	86
000000000000	87
000000000000	88
000000000000	89
000000000000	90
000000000000	91
000000000000	92
000000000000	93
000000000000	94
000000000000	95
000000000000	96
000000000000	97
000000000000	98
000000000000	99

Frames with MPLS tag  
IP Address  
IP Multicast Group

Group Key Distribution
Unicast (unique KEK per group member)
Broadcast (same KEK for all group members)

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

Figure 1 displays the percentage of respondents for different combinations of gender and age group across six countries. The data is presented in a 6x2 grid of bar charts. The columns represent 'Male' and 'Female' respondents. The rows represent age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+. The countries are: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and the United States. Each bar chart shows the percentage of respondents for each gender in that age group for that country. The bars are color-coded: light blue for Male and light orange for Female.

## Thales E-Security

## Network Support

- Bump in the Wire deployment
- Jumbo Frame Support
- Ethernet Flow Control via PAUSE
- Ethernet Fragmentation/Defragmentation
  - Point-to-Point
  - Point-to-Multipoint
  - Multipoint
- Dead Peer Detection
- Optical Loss Pass-Through
- Link Loss Carry Forward

## System Configuration and Management Access

- IPv4
- IPv6
- Out-of-band Management
  - RS-232V.24
  - Separate Ethernet port
- Smart Card (Secure Card) Support
- USB Port
- In-band Management
  - SSH
  - SNMP (read-only/read-write)
  - TLS
  - Proprietary
- Remote Monitoring (SNMP)

## Logs

- Event Log (local)
- Audit Log (local)
- Syslog Support (Server)

## Unit

	Height in 19" Rack
	Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports
	Physical Device Access
	Redundant Power Supply
	Redundant, hot-swappable power supply
	High Availability functionality (two-node cluster)
	MTBF
	Tamper Security
	Security Approvals *
	Safety Approvals
	Boot Time
Cold boot until operational	
Warm boot until operational	

[illegible]

## System Configuration and Management Access

Access	Access	Access	Access	Access	Access
read-only	read-only	read-only	read-only	read-only	read-only
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
V2Cv3	V2Cv3	V2Cv3	V2Cv3	V2Cv3	V2Cv3

## Logs

## Unit

[illegible]

\* Products using the platform have BSI VS-NfD, NATO restricted, EU Restrict (including 2nd Evaluation by NL) approvals



## Thales E-Security

[illegible][illegible]

Viasat

Line Interface/Supported Line Rates		SEC-1140V	SEC-1170
Line Interface/Supported Line Rates	10 Mbps	✓	
	100 Mbps	✓	
	1 Gbps	✓	✓/SFP+
	10 Gbps		✓/SFP28
	25 Gbps		✓/OSFP
Line Interface/Supported Line Rates	40 Gbps		✓/OSFP28
	100 Gbps		
	Virtual Appliance	✓	
Supported Network Topologies			
Supported Network Topologies	Point-to-Point (P2P)		
	Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP)	✓	✓
	Multipoint (MP)	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies			
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies	Port-based		
	Ethernet Private Line (EP-Line)	✓	✓
	Ethernet Private Tree (EP-Tree)	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies	Ethernet Private LAN (EPLAN)	✓	✓
	VLAN-based		
	Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVP-Line)	✓	✓
Supported Metro Ethernet Topologies	Ethernet Virtual Private Tree (EVP-Tree)	✓	✓
	Ethernet Virtual Private LAN (EVP-LAN)	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)			
Supported Networks (Encryption)	Ethernet		
	MP,LS	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Encryption)	IPv4/IPv6	✓	✓
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)			
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)	Ethernet (native)		
	MP,LS (EoMP,LS)	✓	✓
	IPv4/IPv6		
Supported Networks (Transport of Encrypted Frame)	TCP	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017
	UDP	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017
Supported Usage Scenarios			
Supported Usage Scenarios	Single tenant		
	Multi-tenant	✓	✓
	Self-managed	✓	✓
	Managed encryption service	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017
Supported Usage Scenarios	Managed security service	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017	Roadmap Q4 CY 2017
Platform			
Platform used	Mainboard/Firmware	ViaSat/ViaSat	ViaSat/ViaSat
	Key Management	MKAEAPOL-TLS	MKAEAPOL-TLS

EoIP only  
EoIP only

Viasat

Data Plane Encryption Standard and Processing

Encryption Standard	Block Cipher		
	Preferred Mode of Operation	AES	AES
	Alternative Mode of Operation	GCM	GCM
Processing Method	Key Length (in bit)	256	256
	cut-through	✓	✓
	store&forward		
Encryption Hardware	FPGA		✓
	ASIC		
	CPU	✓	
Latency			
	Latency P2P Mode	cut-through	<3µs
	Latency MP Mode	store & forward	
	Latency MP Mode	cut-through	
	store & forward	N/A	<3µs
		N/A	
Encryption Modes			
Native Ethernet Encryption			
Frame Encryption (Bulk - P2P only)			
Integrity protection (algorithm)			
Authentication length (bytes)			
Replay protection			
Variable replay window (size)			
Counter length (in bytes)			
Frame overhead (unauthenticated encryption)			
Frame overhead (authenticated encryption)			
Ethernet multi-hop support			
Transport (Payload only)			
Max. number of peers			
Max. number of MAC Addresses			
Max. number of VLAN IDs			
Integrity protection (algorithm)			
Authentication length (bytes)			
Replay protection			
Variable replay window (size)			
Definable encryption offset (fixed)			
Variable encryption offset			
Adaptive encryption offset based on frame content			
Entropy mutation (unauthenticated encryption only)			
Counter length (in bytes)			
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption			
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)			
Ethernet multi-hop support			
Tunnel (Ethernet over Ethernet)			
Max. number of peers			
Max. number of MAC Addresses			
Max. number of VLAN IDs			
Integrity protection (algorithm)			
Authentication length (bytes)			
Replay protection			
Variable replay window (size)			
Counter length (in bytes)			
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption			
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)			
Ethernet multi-hop support			

Viasat

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)	
Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)	
Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP) Max. number of peers Max. number of MAC Addresses Max. number of VLAN IDs Integrity protection (algorithm) Authentication length (bytes) Replay protection Variable replay window (size) Counter length (in bytes) Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE) Ethernet multi-hop support	
Native IP Encryption	
Supported IP versions	
Supported transmission protocols	
Transport/Tunnel Mode	
Selective Encryption	
Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support	
Traffic Masking	
Traffic Flow Security	

Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
Roadmap Q4 CY2017	Roadmap Q4 CY2017

Ethernet over IP (EoIP)

Tunnel (Ethernet over IP)

Supported transmission protocols (UDP/TCP)  
Max. number of peers  
Max. number of MAC Addresses  
Max. number of VLAN IDs  
Integrity protection (algorithm)  
Authentication length (bytes)  
Replay protection  
Variable replay window (size)  
Counter length (in bytes)  
Frame overhead unauthenticated encryption  
Frame overhead authenticated encryption (AE)  
Ethernet multi-hop support

Native IP Encryption

Supported IP versions

Supported transmission protocols  
TCP  
UDP

Transport/Tunnel Mode

Maximum number of peers  
Maximum number of IP addresses  
Maximum number of multicast groups  
Integrity protection (algorithm)  
Authentication length (bytes)  
Additional Authenticated Data (header)  
Replay Protection  
Variable replay window (size)  
Counter length (in bytes)  
Packet overhead authenticated encryption (AE)

Selective Encryption

Based on MAC Address  
Based on VLAN ID  
Based on Ethernet type  
Based on Multicast Group  
Based on Presence of MPLS Tag  
Based on IP Address  
Combination of multiple selection criteria

Mixed Ethernet, MPLS, EoIP and IP Support

Based on VLAN ID

MPLS  
EoIP  
IP

Based on presence of MPLS tag

MPLS  
EoIP  
IP

Based on VLAN ID and presence of MPLS tag

MPLS  
EoIP  
IP




Traffic Masking

Traffic Flow Security

Viasat

Roadmap Q4 CY2017

Roadmap Q4 CY2017




Roadmap Q4 CY2017

Roadmap Q4 CY2017



Roadmap Q4 CY2017

Roadmap Q4 CY2017



Roadmap Q4 CY2017

Roadmap Q4 CY2017



Roadmap Q4 CY2017

Roadmap Q4 CY2017



## Auto-discovery

- **Aut-discovery of network encryptions**
- **Aut-discovery of key servers**
- **Aut-discovery of VLANs**
- **Disabling of auto-discovery**

## Key Server

- Integrated Key Server
- Support for external Key Server
- External Key Server
- Support for multiple distributed Key Servers
- Support for fail-over to back-up Key Server
- Autonomous operation

## Key Management

### Key Generation and Storage

Hardware Random Number Generation

## Asymmetric Key Algorithms (Public Key Cryptography)

Key length	Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
	Supported Curves :
	NIST
	Brainpool
	Custom Curves

## Hash Algorithms

SHA-2

## Device Authentication

Symmetric Signature: Pre-shared Key (PSK)	Maximum number of PSKs per encryptor	Key length

### Asymmetric Signature: Certificate

Maximum number of certificates per encryptor	Key length
10	1024
10	2048
10	4096
10	8192
10	16384
10	32768
10	65536
10	131072
10	262144
10	524288
10	1048576
10	2097152
10	4194304
10	8388608
10	16777216
10	33554432
10	67108864
10	134217728
10	268435456
10	536870912
10	1073741824
10	2147483648
10	4294967296
10	8589934592
10	17179869184
10	34359738368
10	68719476736
10	137438953472
10	274877906944
10	549755813888
10	1099511627776
10	2199023255552
10	4398046511104
10	8796093022208
10	17592186044416
10	35184372088832
10	70368744177664
10	140737488355328
10	281474976710656
10	562949953421312
10	1125899906842624
10	2251799813685248
10	4503599627370496
10	9007199254740992
10	18014398509481984
10	36028797018963968
10	72057594037927936
10	144115188075855872
10	288230376151711744
10	576460752303423488
10	1152921504606846976
10	2305843009213693952
10	4611686018427387904
10	9223372036854775808
10	18446744073709551616
10	36893488147419103232
10	73786976294838206464
10	147573952589676412928
10	295147905179352825856
10	590295810358705651712
10	1180591620717411303424
10	2361183241434822606848
10	4722366482869645213696
10	9444732965739290427392
10	18889465931478580854784
10	37778931862957161709568
10	75557863725914323419136
10	151115727451828646838272
10	302231454903657293676544
10	604462909807314587353088
10	1208925819614629174706176
10	2417851639229258349412352
10	4835703278458516698824704
10	9671406556917033397649408
10	19342813113834066795298816
10	38685626227668133590597632
10	77371252455336267181195264
10	154742504910672534362390528
10	309485009821345068724781056
10	618970019642690137449562112
10	1237940039285380274899124224
10	2475880078570760549798248448
10	4951760157141521099596496896
10	9903520314283042199192993792
10	19807040628566084398385987584
10	39614081257132168796771975168
10	79228162514264337593543950336
10	158456325028528675187087900672
10	316912650057057350374175801344
10	633825300114114700748351602688
10	1267650600228229401496703205376
10	2535301200456458802993406410752
10	5070602400912917605986812821504
10	10141204801825835211973625643008
10	20282409603651670423947251286016
10	40564819207303340847894502572032
10	81129638414606681695789005144064
10	162259276829213363391578010288128
10	324518553658426726783156020576256
10	649037107316853453566312041152512
10	1298074214633706907132624082305024
10	2596148429267413814265248164610048

Ad-hoc authentication of peers (manual)  
Signature key protocol

### Key Agreement and Key Exchange

Master Key (KEK) Agreement	
Master Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol	
Automatic Change of Master Key	
Minimum suggested Time Interval for Master Key Change (min)	
Separate Master Key (KEK) per site	
Separate Master Key (KEK) per group	
Session Key (DEK) Exchange Agreement	
Session Key (DEK) Exchange Protocol	
Automatic Change of Session Keys	
Minimum Time Interval for Session Key Change (min)	

## Viasat

✓	Roadmap Q4 CY2017	✓	Roadmap Q4 CY2017
✓	Roadmap Q4 CY2017	✓	Roadmap Q4 CY2017

2

👉 (dependent on CPU)	👉
N/A	TEMP

VNF requires Intel RDRAND (Hardware TRNG) built into all Xeons

394

512	512
-----	-----

✓ 512	✓ 512	Connectivity Association Key (CAK), also used for key derivation to get SAKs and KEKs
256	256	256-bit CAKs and a 128-bit CAK-Name (CKN) which is cryptographically derived from the CAK.
✓ 5,509	x.509	Certificates used for asymmetric exchange and key derivation exchange
1	1	Only 1 certificate currently supported - due to market re-aligning when multi-tenant support will be added.

ECDSA w/SHA384	ECDSA w/SHA384
100%	100%

TLS 1.2	TLS 1.2
EAP ✓	EAP ✓
60 ✓	60 ✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
5	5

Certificates have to be provisioned onto units via management port. at our factory with a unique cert per unit

Currently units are shipped with a ViaSat default Certificate per unit, and are then pre-provisioned

Viasat

Key System

Point-to-Point Key System	
Supported key system	Pairwise
Group	
Key assignment based on:	MAC Address VLAN ID Port Group IP Address
Point-to-Multipoint Key System	
Supported key systems:	Pairwise Group
Key assignment based on:	MAC Address VLAN ID Port Group IP Address
Multipoint Key System	
Supported key systems:	Pairwise Group Mixed (pairwise unicast, group multicast)
Key assignment based on:	MAC address (pairwise and mixed) Multicast groups (mixed) VLAN ID (group) Port Group (group) IP Address IP Multicast Group
Individual key per multicast group Individual key per broadcast group (VLAN ID)	
Group Key System Specifics	
Additional separate authentication per group	
Group Membership Definition	Multicast group membership Individual membership Network membership VLAN membership Trunked VLAN membership IP Address
Exclusion	MAC address VLAN ID Frames with MPLS tag IP Address IP Multicast Group
Group Key Distribution	Unicast (unique KEK per group member) Broadcast (same KEK for all group members)

✓	✓
Unidirectional Group	Unidirectional Group

✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓
✓		✓	✓

✓	✓
Unidirectional Group	Unidirectional Group

✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓
✓		✓	✓

✓	✓
Unidirectional Group	Unidirectional Group

✓	✓	✓	✓
✓	✓	✓	✓
✓		✓	✓

✓	✓
Roadmap Q2 2017	Roadmap Q2 2017

✓	✓
✓	✓

Network Support

Bump in the Wire deployment	
Jumbo Frame Support	
Ethernet Flow Control via PAUSE	
Ethernet Fragmentation/Defragmentation	
Point-to-Point	
Point-to-Multipoint	
Multipoint	
Dead Peer Detection	
Optical Loss Pass-Through	
Link Loss Carry Forward	

System Configuration and Management Access

IPv4	
IPv6	
Out-of-band Management	RS-232V.24
Smart Card (Secure Card) Support	Separate Ethernet port
USB Port	
In-band Management	SSH
	SNMP (read-only/read-write)
	TLS
	Proprietary
Remote Monitoring (SNMP)	

Logs

Event Log (local)	
Audit Log (local)	
Syslog Support (Server)	

Unit

Height in 19" Rack	
Number of external encrypted Ethernet ports	
Physical Device Access	
Redundant Power Supply	
Redundant, hot-swappable power supply	
High Availability functionality (two-node cluster)	
MTBF	
Tamper Security	
Security Approvals	
Safety Approvals	
Boot Time	Cold boot until operational (P2P) Warm boot until operational (P2P)

Viasat

✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓

✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
Roadmap Q3 CY2017	Roadmap Q3 CY2017
V3	V3

✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓

N/A	1
unrestricted	up to 4 front
N/A	
1-1	✓
1-1	1-1
N/A	TE/TP

FIPS-140-2 Level 3 CY2017, NIAP/CC EAL-4  
EN50222 class B - FCC Part 15 Class B

All planned; FIPS is in process.

560s	120s
560s	120s

Management Software

User Interface	Native PC application Embedded Webapp CLI
Initial Device Set-up	Local (out-of-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Device Configuration	Local (out-of-band) Remote (in-band) Remote (out-of-band)
Management Access	Role-based access Identity-based authentication of user Number of hierarchy levels Number of roles Strict internal separation of users
Device Management	Device Diagnostics Link Monitoring (SNMP) Connection Diagnostics In-band Network Diagnostics Remote Update/Upgrade
Certificate Authority & Management	Certificate Creation Certificate Management
Key Management	Group creation Group Isolation Key assignment Fail-over configuration

Price

List Price Encryption Unit (in €)	1G VNF, or 10G SEC-1170
List Price Encryption Unit (in €)	4x10G, 4x25G
List Price Encryption Unit (in €)	100G
Per external Key Server (in €)	
Required Management Software	2-10 encryptors 11-25 encryptors 26-50 encryptors 51+ encryptors
Warranty Period (months)	Parts & Work
Warranty Coverage	Basic Support (9 to 5, e-mail, phone) Software updates and upgrades
Warranty Extension (per year)	

Viasat

✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓

✓	✓
3	3
2	2
✓	✓

✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓

Roadmap Q2 CY2017	Roadmap Q2 CY2017
Roadmap Q2 CY2017	Roadmap Q2 CY2017

✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓
✓	✓

Price

on request	on request
	on request

12	12
✓	✓